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Far-Right wins in Austria and Germany: what mainstream parties keep getting wrong

Cas Mudde and Gabriela Greilinger 11th October 2024

Recent far-right victories in Europe reveal the dangerous effects of mainstreaming extremist views and the urgent need for a new political strategy.

shutterstock 2510449537
Sömmerda, Germany, August 24, 2024. Hundreds of people attend the Summer Festival in the centre of the town and listen to Citizens’ dialogue with Björn Höcke (photo: Ryan Nash Photography/shutterstock.com)

The recent elections in Austria and Germany have put the far right back at the centre of the public debate. While most media emphasise the (alleged) newness of the results, such as the first time in the postwar era that a far-right party came first in Austria or a German state, the results primarily reflect some of the critical elements of the so-called “fourth phase” of the postwar far right, i.e. its mainstreaming and normalising. Given the continued “shock” in the public debate, discussing some of these critical elements in more detail while referencing the most recent elections in Austria and Germany (among others) makes sense.

1. The Far-Right is relevant

During the so-called “third phase” of the postwar far-right, i.e. in the last two decades of the 20th century, far-right parties achieved electoral breakthroughs in some European countries (e.g. Austria and France). Still, both far-right parties and positions remained largely marginalised. Immigration was mostly kept off the political agenda and far-right parties were kept out of (national) governments. This has changed radically in the “fourth phase”. Today, far-right parties are relevant in European politics!

The Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori argued that political parties were relevant when they could affect (national) coalition formation. They could do this in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, parties can have “coalition potential”, meaning they are considered koalitionsfähig, i.e. are seen as potential coalition partners. This is the case for the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), for example, which already has been a member of the national government before and is currently considered an acceptable coalition partner by the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) – albeit with the caveat, at least for now, that FPÖ-leader Herbert Kickl cannot be part of an FPÖ-ÖVP coalition. Alternatively, parties can have “blackmail potential”, meaning that they can influence coalition formation by making some preferred coalition options impossible. This is the case in much of East Germany, most notably Brandenburg, where the Social Democratic Party (SPD) might feel forced to govern with the left-conservative Alliance Sarah Wagenknecht (BSW) to circumvent the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). 

However, far-right parties have not only become relevant for coalition formation but also influence the policies of other parties and governments they are not part of. Germany provides a great example of both. The AfD is one of the key reasons why immigration has been at the top of the German political agenda for much of the past ten years, which has moved almost all other parties to a more anti-immigration agenda and even helped create a new party, the BSW, an anti-immigrant split of The Left. The AfD’s electoral success in the East German state elections was also the real reason the German federal government tightened immigration and re-introduced border control.

2. The Far-Right Is Here to Stay

Much of the media debate about the far right suffers from violent mood swings. When a few prominent far-right parties or politicians lose shortly after each other, the far right is “dying”, while if a few win shortly after another, the far right “surges” – thereby simultaneously suggesting the far right is a uniform actor. Regardless of debates that portray the far right as a wave that ebbs and flows, Austria and Germany show that the far right is here to stay, albeit in different ways. In Austria, the FPÖ has dominated the far right since 1986, when newly elected party leader Jörg Haider pulled the party (fully) into the far right. Although the party has suffered major splits and scandals, it is still at the heart of Austrian politics. 

In Germany, the far right has been represented – albeit primarily at the state level – by various parties throughout time, from The Republicans in the 1990s through the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) in the 2000s, to the (most successful) AfD today. In most of the cases, the electoral success of these parties was “explained” by a (immigration) “crisis”, but the recent successes in East Germany show that no “crisis” is necessary. Rather, the success of the far right is a consequence of structural changes in society, most notably the development of multicultural societies, and reflects nativist and other reactionary attitudes that exist among significant portions of the population. These (nativist) attitudes feed far-right support and they are here to stay.

3. No Country Is Immune to the Far-Right

The idea that certain countries (and societies) are immune to the far right has long been popular in academic and public debates. The Dutch and Swedes liked to think they were too “tolerant” for the far right. Some English commentators argued that the English never embraced “extremism”. Some academics argued that Portugal and Spain were immune to the far right because of the recent memories of right-wing dictatorships, while others argued that the German Vergangenheitsbewältigung (dealing with history) explained why that country was immune to the far right. We know better today. The far right is not only electorally successful in all these countries, but it is or has been part of (sub-)national governments in most of them. 

Moreover, even in the few countries where the cordon sanitaire survives (somewhat), like France and Germany, far-right frames and positions are propagated by “mainstream” parties. This is most forceful in the immigration issue. Today, not just centre-right but increasingly also social democrat politicians position themselves critically towards immigration, as recent expansions of border controls in Germany in response to the AfD’s electoral successes illustrate. And while there was widespread outrage in January over a secret meeting by far-right actors in Germany where plans of “remigration”, a euphemism for deportation, were discussed, these frames and ideas have quickly found their way into the mainstream discourse.

4. Mainstreaming Does Not Work

Mainstream parties often coopt far-right frames and positions, suggesting this is necessary to “win voters back” or “defeat the far right”. A prime example of this was Sebastian Kurz’s nativist shift after his takeover of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), after which the party increasingly resembled the far-right on immigration issues. However, academic research is very clear on this: it does not work. In fact, when immigration is the key issue of an election, and the dominant frame is a far-right one (i.e. immigration as a threat), far-right parties do well. Although this has been the case for decades, “mainstream” parties continue to delude themselves (and their voters), as was evident in the most recent elections in Sweden, The Netherlands, and Germany. Similarly, if you make the far right one of the key issues of the election, constantly giving them and their issues more attention by pointing to the looming danger they present, they win. This was likewise the case in both Austria and Germany, where mainstream parties continuously warned about the rise of the far-right but failed to present themselves as a viable alternative.

Another argument for mainstreaming the far right and governing with them is that this will moderate them. Again, there is little academic evidence for this position. Most scholarly research shows that the mainstreaming of the far right is almost exclusively the consequence of the radicalisation of the mainstream, not of the moderation of the far right. In fact, there are some indications that the far-right movement is radicalising, too, to continue to stand out. Several established far-right parties have started to speak in racial terms, as the example of Vlaams Belang in Belgium shows, or defend anti-democratic politicians like Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. 

5. Normalization Has Changed the Normative Consensus

While “mainstreaming” is primarily an empirical process, i.e. the increased convergence of positions (notably on immigration) of far-right and “mainstream” parties, “normalisation” is a normative process, reflecting changes in what is considered “normal” or “the norm”. This is often described in terms of changing the Overton Window, simply stated, “the range of ideas the public is willing to consider and accept”. After decades of mainstream islamophobia and nativism in both media and politics, it is increasingly difficult to “shock” the people. And, even if there is outrage, the far-right has a successful script to turn itself from the villain into the victim, as linguist and discourse analyst Ruth Wodak has shown.

For a long time, there was a “law” in the study of far-right politics that held that open flirting with “extreme right” ideas would lead to electoral irrelevance. Clearly, this is no longer the case. Today, being openly extreme, including open references to the Nazi era, is no longer a hindrance to electoral success or political office, as recent cases also demonstrate. For example, in Austria, video material revealed far-right politicians’ attendance at a funeral days before the elections, where a “SS song” that glorifies the holy German Reich was sung. Two days later, the party celebrated its best election result in history. And this was just the most recent incident of FPÖ politicians openly displaying Nazi sympathies. Udo Landbauer, the former leader of the party’s youth wing, resigned in 2018 after a scandal over a Nazi-glorifying songbook, but now serves as the deputy governor of the state of Lower Austria. 

Similarly, the AfD’s unofficial leader, Björn Höcke, frequently employs Nazi phrases and has already been fined twice for doing so. Although he claims ignorance, his past as a history teacher makes it highly doubtful that he indeed was unaware of the Nazi connotations. Even with the convictions, Höcke led the AfD to its best result in any state, coming in first with the support of one in every three voters in Thuringia.

Moving Forward

Although it is probably naïve, let’s hope that the recent elections finally lead to a better understanding of contemporary politics. The far-right is relevant, and it is here to stay. Far-right parties are the biggest, or at least biggest right-wing, parties in a growing number of European countries. They are not the result of individual “crises” but rather structural societal changes and mass attitudes and are here to stay. Mainstreaming and normalising the far right does not weaken them; rather, it strengthens them.

Similarly, governing with them does not necessarily weaken them, and even when it does, far-right parties usually return to their initial strength (as happened in Austria). All the while, liberal democracy is weakened, and vulnerable populations are marginalised even more. It is, therefore, high time that mainstream parties move away from simply copying the far right and instead set their own agenda and develop their own policies. This does not mean ignoring issues like crime, corruption, or immigration, but it does mean policies that defend minority rights and strengthen liberal democracy. 

Cas Mudde
Cas Mudde

Cas Mudde is the Stanley Wade Shelton UGAF Professor of International Affairs and a Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Georgia. He is also the author of The Far Right Today (2019).

Gabriela Greilinger
Gabriela Greilinger

Gabriela Greilinger is a PhD student in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, where she studies the far right in Europe.

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