Europe increasingly finds itself alone in the international arena. It is slowly but unmistakably adapting to a more hostile global environment—one in which its core values and interests are being challenged; one where open markets, multilateral cooperation, democratic governance, and respect for human rights are becoming scarcer.
Two fundamental forces are driving this shift. The first is the rise of authoritarian powers, with Russia and China as the primary actors. The stalled democratisation process across parts of the Arab world fits this pattern as well. Looking back over the past two decades, it is difficult to dispute that the world has grown less democratic and more fractured.
The second driver is perhaps more consequential and less widely understood: the surge of national populism within liberal democracies, and its influence on the domestic and foreign policies of Western states. The most striking example is the United States under Donald Trump.
Since Trump returned to office just four weeks ago, he has unleashed a series of measures that, collectively, amount to a deliberate undermining of the international liberal order. His tariffs disrupt World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, fracturing global trade. His administration has withdrawn from the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNESCO, and cut funding to other United Nations bodies. Trump has imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resulting in asset freezes and travel bans on its chief prosecutor. His administration’s endorsement of Israel’s annexation of Gaza, a clear violation of the right of return for millions of displaced Palestinians, further erodes the principle of international law. His withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is another blow to multilateralism and the global fight against climate change.
Taken together, these actions illustrate a growing divergence between American foreign policy and that of Europe. Europe is the world’s most trade-dependent economy and a staunch advocate of multilateralism, human rights, and climate action. Today, it is difficult to identify a major international issue where European and American priorities align.
Beyond these policy rifts, the transatlantic relationship itself is fraying. Trump’s open threats to Denmark over Greenland are but one example of the strains. The past few days have been particularly extraordinary. The United States has initiated peace negotiations with Russia over Ukraine without consulting its European allies. Even as these words are written, American and Russian officials are meeting in Riyadh, once again excluding Europe. This is despite the fact that the European Union and its member states have collectively committed more than one hundred billion dollars to the war effort and have been deeply engaged diplomatically since the conflict began. The war in Ukraine is arguably the most consequential security crisis in Europe’s post-Cold War history. Its resolution will profoundly shape the security architecture of Eastern Europe and determine Ukraine’s political future. To sideline Europe from such negotiations is to ignore its most vital interests.
Faced with this reality, Europe must confront a pressing question: What kind of foreign and security policy does it require in this increasingly hostile world? There is only one plausible answer—to integrate further and forge a united, coherent, and influential European Union foreign policy. For the collection of medium-sized and small states that comprise the EU, there is no alternative.
Europe must invest more—and spend more effectively—on defence. In the short term, it should aim to assume full responsibility for its continental security, a task currently shared with NATO and, therefore, the United States. Europe must also be capable of defending its values and safeguarding its interests in its immediate neighbourhood—most urgently in Ukraine—by assuming a leadership role in achieving a just and lasting peace.
Sceptics argue that a European defence policy is unattainable, or that Europe cannot confront the Russian threat alone. But the European Union’s economy is nearly ten times the size of Russia’s, and the combined defence expenditure of EU member states is four times that of Moscow. If Europe cannot muster the will and capacity to support Ukraine and secure its eastern flank, it faces a profound crisis of strategic autonomy.
In this more hostile world, Europe alone must mean Europe united. Achieving this will require bridging internal divisions and making the case to European citizens that the age of strategic responsibility has arrived. Difficult trade-offs between defence and social spending lie ahead. European leaders must be forthright about these choices, ensuring that citizens understand the stakes.
If Europe fails to rise to this challenge, it risks not only irrelevance but a future marked by deep insecurity.
Manuel Muniz is Provost of IE University and a Professor of Practice of International Relations.
