As Europe enters a new political cycle, the EU faces immense geopolitical and economic challenges in a multipolar world.
As the EU’s new political cycle, following the June 2024 European Parliament elections, kicks off with the launch of the second Von der Leyen Commission Presidency, the arrival of Antonio Costa as President of the European Council, and the Polish Government under Donald Tusk taking over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the EU faces both immediate and long-term challenges and dilemmas. The leadership team that emerged at the end of 2024 is a strong one, and the EU will need this team to work in a collaborative and cooperative manner to leverage influence. Together, they represent the collective EU.
The emerging 21st-century global order/disorder is not one that suits the EU’s DNA, its history or preferences. The EU is the world’s most robust multilateral institution, and its members have a pronounced preference for a rules-based international order in which trade is regulated and its security underpinned by the Transatlantic Alliance. The structural challenges facing the EU are both geo-political and geo-economic. Global power balances and authority structures are shifting in multiple unpredictable ways that do not favour the EU. The EU’s predominant power sources, both normative and regulatory, are insufficient and incomplete for the world in which Europe finds itself. The beginning of a second Trump presidency accentuates the EU’s challenges and dilemmas, as he will bring unpredictability, disruption, and an anti-EU bias to bear on transatlantic relations. Yet the EU is not destined to be a plaything and has the agency to be a player in this evolving global system. To do so, it must learn to navigate the emerging multipolar world and mobilise resources for collective action in key areas.
Playing into a Multipolar World
The bipolar world of the Cold War era gave way to a brief period of unipolarity when US power and projection surpassed that of any other state or group of states in the world. Today’s world is multipolar, as neither of the two large powers—the US or China—commands the power and influence to dictate the rules of the game in international politics. However, contemporary multipolarity is unbalanced, as these two states serve as strong poles of attraction, but there is also space for other powers to exert influence and project power. Middle powers, notably Russia, Iran, Turkey, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Japan, are on the rise. At this juncture, should the EU conclude that it is a middle power, or should it aspire to be a pole of attraction—not as powerful as either China or the US, but powerful nonetheless? If the EU aspires to be a global player, it should act as a pole of attraction in its neighbourhood and a hedge for other states faced with the two great powers.
The evolution of US-Sino relations under Trump will significantly influence how Europe navigates a multipolar world. The balance between competition and cooperation is critical for Europe. So too is the level of security or economic vulnerability to either power. The EU has long debated the question of strategic autonomy but must now decide on the actions it needs to take to move towards the future in a proactive strategic manner. There is a premium on agility and adaptability in a world of jockeying powers and unpredictable politics. The EU needs to be resolute with both major powers and be prepared to defend itself. The political agreement with Mercosur, concluded on December 6, 2024, is an exemplary instance of hedging US-Sino relations and strengthening multilateralism in the global system. The objections from European environmentalists and farmers may well derail the agreement, but this would be a major signal of European weakness.
Europe must learn to manage the increasing troubles caused by disruptor states, especially Russia, a power determined to undermine European security and its democracies. Europe is engaged in a hybrid war with Russia, and the eastern half of the continent is immersed in a struggle to assert its sovereignty and independence as Putin seeks to regain control over former Soviet republics. Ukraine is the country that pays the highest price for Putin’s imperialist venture, but all of the former Soviet states are torn between those who lean towards Russia and those who lean towards the EU. The key lesson for the EU from the last decade is the imperative to support the pro-EU forces in all of these states. The record is mixed. Belarus is firmly in the Russian camp, and Moldova struggles with energy access following the closure of the Ukrainian transit route. Protests have rocked Georgia following the government’s decision to freeze talks with the EU. The outcome of the war in Ukraine, along with the political battles in other post-Soviet states, will shape the EU’s security and political landscape for decades to come. The EU has yet to grasp the full impact of Putin’s plans. To do so will require the EU to mobilise and generate the capacities for effective action.
Mobilising Capacity
The analysis has been conducted. Both the Letta and Draghi Reports set out in stark terms Europe’s need for strategic investment in technology, climate mitigation, defence, and security. The EU is now entering a period of significant choices and trade-offs. The power base of the past—values and markets—is insufficient. The Union needs to leverage public finance and collective borrowing to meet its geo-economic and strategic needs. In the short term, it must enhance its capacity to support and protect Ukraine. It must do so either through the collective efforts of the entire EU or by coalitions of the willing if unity is not forthcoming. The pro-Russian stances of Orban and Fico militate against an all-EU effort. The default assumption in the EU is that the US elite consensus in favour of a transatlantic defence is over. The Union must take seriously the need to find its strategic purpose and military capacity. It cannot achieve this without the involvement of non-EU European states, notably the UK, Turkey, and Norway.
The next decade is likely to be the most consequential for the EU and wider Europe since the end of the Second World War. There are no easy options, only tough choices and trade-offs. A failure to make decisions will further weaken Europe and undermine its agency and capacity to play an important, albeit not dominant, role in the world. The challenges are immense, yet Europe has recovered in the past from two world wars in the 20th century, enjoying 50 years of relative peace and prosperity. However, political instability in Germany and France, along with the rise of the radical right in many countries, complicates these choices and makes trade-offs more difficult and hazardous. The EU is about to discover whether it has the capacity to forge its future in these times or whether it will yield to forces beyond its borders. Peace, prosperity, and democracy are all at stake.
This article is part of the Project “EU Forward” Social Europe runs in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Brigid Laffan is Emeritus Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI). She joined the EUI in 2013 and retired from the role in August 2021. She was previously Professor of European Politics at University College Dublin. She also serves as President of the European Policy Centre (EPC) and Chancellor of the University of Limerick and chair of its governing body.