The political tides are turning across the Western world. Forces determined to demolish the post-war global order are advancing with alarming speed, and surprisingly little appears capable of stopping them. Drawing on new research on European integration, I argue that liberals’ unpreparedness for these seismic shifts stems from something far deeper than short-term material grievances. They may simply have exhausted their supply of compelling visions for the future.
The power of political storytelling
A familiar refrain echoes through analyses of far-right success: voters are somehow dissatisfied with the status quo. In response, policymakers instinctively retreat to “deliverism”, banking on technical reforms and incremental adjustments to “fix” the far right out of existence. Yet mounting evidence suggests this approach misreads the moment, pointing instead to the necessity of long-term strategic thinking.
Taking this critique seriously demands acknowledging an uncomfortable truth: political triumph requires more than competent management. It demands a sweeping narrative of transformation—a vision of a different and better future that can capture the imagination of those alienated by current arrangements. The resounding victories of economically destructive movements from Brexit to Trumpism demonstrate that methodical tweaks to existing systems, however rational they appear on paper, cannot compete with bold narratives of radical change.
Restoring political equilibrium therefore requires, among many prerequisites, achieving a balance of ideas. Whether the battlefield concerns democracy, liberal rights, or the international order, the radical right offers clear, tangible proposals for transformation that effortlessly overshadow liberal incrementalism. Meanwhile, liberals have systematically eroded their own once-promising narratives by retreating from ambitious reform, leaving their ideas threadbare through overuse and underdelivery.
Consider one particularly instructive case of ideational imbalance: the European Union. This liberal, transnational institution, painstakingly constructed after the Second World War, now faces relentless assault from radical-right forces. From Marine Le Pen’s National Rally to the architects of Brexit, the attack follows a consistent script: the EU stands accused of being a soulless market-making machine, socially disconnected from ordinary citizens. The right-wing prescription remains equally consistent—a return to unfettered national sovereignty.
Historically, the political left possessed an equally compelling counter-narrative: a “social Europe“. This vision promised to develop pan-European social protection mechanisms, offering a clear alternative to both lopsided market integration and nationalist isolation. It represented a fundamentally different Europe—one that balanced economic freedoms with social solidarity. Yet as I demonstrate in my recent book, Ideas of Social Europe, this progressive counter-narrative has been hollowed out.
The paradox of universal agreement
Remarkably, the promise of a “social Europe” hasn’t disappeared—it has become ubiquitous. Election after election, politicians across the ideological spectrum champion their commitment to social Europe. Nearly every pro-European party now claims ownership of this vision in some form. What has fundamentally shifted, however, are the ideas underpinning this ostensibly shared commitment.
Employing the framework of discursive institutionalism, I examined an extensive corpus of documents—from election manifestos to European Commission white papers—to decode what decision-makers actually mean when they invoke “social Europe”. The findings reveal a striking convergence around a minimalist “common core” of shared assumptions. According to this consensus, the EU should support national welfare states primarily through human capital investments, following the logic of social investment to strengthen economic competitiveness. Ambitious pan-European welfare schemes, once the beating heart of the “social Europe” vision, have become virtually taboo. Today’s overwhelming consensus insists that social policy must remain firmly anchored at the national level.
This consensus might appear unproblematic if one accepts that nation-states indeed represent the optimal arena for social policy. It becomes profoundly problematic, however, when we recall the fundamental purpose of the “social Europe” promise: to articulate a vision of a radically different future where the EU actively balances its market-making impulses with tangible social protection for all citizens. Originally conceived by socialists as a vehicle for achieving their objectives at the pan-European level, the term’s mainstreaming under a status-quo-friendly banner has neutralised its disruptive potential. While “social Europe” realised through piecemeal “deliverism” can still yield material improvements, its power as a political tool has withered.
The situation deteriorates further. My research in Ideas of Social Europe demonstrates that both the European Commission and parties in the European Parliament recognise social Europe’s diminishing political magnetism—yet they dare not respond with genuinely ambitious proposals. Instead, they resort to rhetorical twists, attaching increasingly grandiose labels to technical, piecemeal policies. This overcompensation merely accelerates public disillusionment, creating a vicious cycle of raised expectations and inevitable disappointment.
Beyond Brussels: a global warning
This dynamic transcends both social policy and the European Union. It exemplifies a broader imbalance between ideas for change championed by progressives and liberals versus those advanced by the radical right and isolationist movements. These ideational asymmetries may prove crucial to understanding why liberal post-war institutions find themselves under existential threat.
These institutions have undeniably delivered prosperity and stability, yet many citizens now struggle with economic precarity or fear losing their social status. Not all such anxieties warrant a left-wing response—some status loss experienced by the historically privileged inevitably results from a world becoming more equitable for disadvantaged groups. Nevertheless, discontent arising from genuine socio-economic hardship demands serious engagement and substantive solutions.
For decades, progressive political forces have articulated comprehensive agendas for reforming key liberal institutions to serve the disadvantaged more effectively. While these promises retained credibility among sufficiently large constituencies, voters had little incentive to embrace risky proposals aimed at demolishing these institutions entirely. Political promises, however, carry expiration dates. When a slogan echoes through countless campaigns without materialising into concrete change, it loses all gravitational pull. As progressives transform into guardians of an unsatisfactory status quo, they inadvertently drive those seeking change into the arms of more radical alternatives. This is not to say that illiberal and anti-democratic backlash is “the left’s fault”. Still, it is worth asking how liberals can catch up in offering new and innovative ideas of meaningful progress.
Social Europe thus serves as a cautionary tale with global implications. Not only liberals but also thoughtful conservatives must develop strategies for evolving post-war institutions if they hope to preserve their fundamental achievements. This demands something far more substantial than technocratic tinkering. It requires concrete, tangible visions for a genuinely different future—coupled with the political courage to pursue the transformative steps necessary to realise them. Without such vision and resolve, the ideational battlefield will remain dominated by those who promise to tear everything down, leaving defenders of liberal democracy armed only with increasingly hollow slogans and the fading memory of better times.
Dominic Afscharian holds degrees in political science and economics from Heidelberg University and the University of Tübingen. He has worked with think tanks, consultancies and academic institutions and is currently a research officer at the Zentrum für neue Sozialpolitik in Berlin.
