As democracy falters, voters turn to populists. Can innovation save democracy from its outdated frameworks?

Jean-Marie Le Pen, who lived to the age of 96, reminds us that extreme right populism has been a persistent feature of European politics since the rise of liberal democracy after World War II. First elected to the French parliament in 1956, Le Pen never attained the level of influence that his daughter commands today. This is because, during the golden years of European democracy, there was limited demand for populists.
However, this dynamic has shifted dramatically in recent years. Nativist populists have emerged victorious at the ballot box not only in Central and Eastern Europe but also in Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and France. With the return of Donald Trump to the White House, it appears that populists are poised to dominate the political landscape across the Western world for some time to come.
What went wrong?
Many have their own lists of individuals or factors they hold responsible for the rise of populists to power. Some point to capitalism, neoliberalism, migration, or globalisation. Others identify China, Russia, the United States, or the European Union as culprits. There is also a roster of liberal centre-left and centre-right politicians blamed for the populist surge. For some, the fault lies with Margaret Thatcher; for others, Tony Blair. Some criticise Gerhard Schröder or Angela Merkel, while others point to Nicolas Sarkozy or Emmanuel Macron.
While this list could go on, one cannot ignore the argument put forth by the renowned populism expert Cas Mudde. In his 2019 Leonard Schapiro Lecture, later published in The Government and Opposition journal, Mudde argued that as liberal democracy erodes, the demand for populist politicians rises: “populism is essentially an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism.”
A recent Ipsos Knowledge Panel survey revealed that nearly half of respondents are dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in their country. Another credible poll showed that over sixty percent of Europeans admitted they “tend not to trust” their democratically elected national governments and parliaments. Numerous other studies corroborate the precarious state of democracy and highlight how populists are exploiting this vulnerability.
It is not that the new generation of populist leaders is inherently more skilled or charismatic than their predecessors. Matteo Salvini is no more adept than Umberto Bossi; Geert Wilders lacks the charisma of Pim Fortuyn; Marine Le Pen is not a better orator than her father; and Herbert Kickl does not possess the local roots of Jörg Haider (incidentally, Kickl began his career as Haider’s ghostwriter). The current success of populists stems from the distortion of liberal democracy, which drives voters to embrace illiberal, undemocratic alternatives. The pressing question is: how can unhappy voters be won back?
Misguided responses
One might expect liberals to acknowledge their mistakes and work to reduce the demand for populism by restoring democracy’s legitimacy. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Some argue that the best antidote to populism is a liberal version of populism. Others advocate for technocracy as a bulwark against the populist post-truth era. Both camps have mounted vigorous public campaigns against populist parties and leaders, with meagre results at best—a situation that is not difficult to understand.
While individual populist politicians and parties can be discredited and removed from power, this does not address the underlying demand for populism. Figures like Le Pen, Wilders, or Kaczyński will simply be replaced by other populists as long as democracy remains in disrepair. The goal should be to reduce the demand for populism, not merely to oust specific populist figures or parties.
The technocratic solutions favoured by the anti-populist camp may resolve practical issues such as financial instability, public deficits, or health crises. However, technocracy has little in common with democracy, as it diminishes the role of parliaments, limits citizen participation, and reduces transparency in decision-making. While democracy must be both effective and representative, delegating decisions to unelected experts or institutions only frustrates citizens, especially during difficult times. What is the point of democratic elections if decisions are made by technocrats, courts, or banks?
Combatting populism with populism is an even worse strategy, as it legitimises lawlessness, demagoguery, and racism. The concept of “liberal populism” is fundamentally flawed, as populism embodies everything the intellectual founders of liberalism opposed. If a liberal adopts the rhetoric and tactics of a populist, they cease to be a liberal. Full stop.
The way forward
In 2021, researchers asked Europeans how they would feel about reducing the number of national parliamentarians and replacing them with Artificial Intelligence (AI) equipped with access to citizen data. Surprisingly, half of the respondents, particularly younger individuals, expressed enthusiasm. It is unclear whether this reflects trust in AI or distrust in the political class. Nonetheless, it underscores the need for democratic reforms that extend beyond traditional agendas of elections, parliaments, constitutions, and parties. Democracy must also address the new challenges posed by technological advances, including AI.
The national framework in which democracy operates is ill-suited to the global digital landscape of interconnected communications and transactions. Moreover, democracy’s current pace is too slow for a world operating at the speed of the internet, 24/7.
Populists propose dismantling the rule of law, checks and balances, independent media, and minority rights in their bid to “fix” democracy. This rebranded autocracy, misleadingly termed illiberal democracy, allows for swift decision-making without public consultation or parliamentary deliberation. However, quick decisions are not always wise or legitimate, which explains why autocracies frequently falter. Furthermore, populists’ sovereigntist tendencies clash with the transnational connectivity fostered by the internet.
Liberals rightly criticise populists for dismantling the traditional pillars of the democratic order. However, this critique often veers into nostalgia for a bygone era when political parties were deeply rooted in civil society, parliaments were forums for genuine public debate, and ministers trusted experienced civil servants. Today, power resides with informal networks that have capitalised on the digital revolution. These networks treat voters as consumers, while national governments wield authority over vulnerable citizens or migrants but are powerless against multinational corporations controlling communication, finance, and labour flows.
In this context, the notions of a social contract or national interest have become almost virtual. Existing democratic institutions struggle to mediate conflicts and forge meaningful compromises because “sovereignty and power are becoming separated from the politics of the territorial nation-state.” Consider the weak and hesitant responses of Europe’s liberal governments to Elon Musk’s provocations.
Turning back the clock is impossible, as the digital and AI revolutions will continue to advance. Democracy must therefore adapt to a world where people think, desire, and interact differently than they did during its golden era decades ago. While there is no blueprint for democratic transformation, we must have the courage to experiment. Can you name any significant democratic reforms introduced since the advent of the World Wide Web over three decades ago?
Businesses have adapted to the digital age, as has organised crime; yet democracy remains stuck in a framework more suited to the era of Alexis de Tocqueville. It is time to explore new forms of e-democracy that empower ordinary citizens. We should embrace multi-level governance, compelling states to share resources and decision-making with local and transnational actors. Informal networks should also be harnessed to deliver public goods. Experiments carry risks, but if we adhere to liberal values while innovating, we might navigate our way out of the populist labyrinth.
Jan Zielonka is professor of politics and international relations at the University of Venice, Cá Foscari, and at the University of Oxford. His latest book is The Lost Future and How to Reclaim It (Yale University Press, 2023).