Uncertainty need not be a curse. It can also encompass possibilities and unseen futures that bring positive transformation to any given status quo. The current state of the world cannot become an alibi for paralysis, defensive behaviour or lack of vision. Daily headlines suggest we face a volatile context after a cumulative sequence of shocks over the past decade. Brazil’s situation forms part of this broader environment, yet it also results from a decade of profound political instability that has tested the resilience of Latin America’s largest democracy.
Several decisive events have shaped Brazil’s reality in 2025. The mass protests of June 2013, the commodities crisis of 2013-2014, the severe economic recession of 2015-2016, President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in May 2016, Jair Bolsonaro’s election in 2018, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the attempted coup against Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on 8 January 2023 — each of these moments has left indelible marks on the nation’s political landscape.
Brazil has long been characterised by low trust in government and low interpersonal trust — classic indicators of democratic fragility. The erosion of governmental trust began during Dilma Rousseff’s first mandate (2011-2014), which succeeded Lula’s earlier presidency. A sense of institutional malaise erupted in June 2013, when hundreds of thousands of Brazilians took to the streets to protest against failures in education, health, security and public transport. This social dissatisfaction was aggravated by the economic crisis that followed. During this period, the executive branch lost ground to the legislature, which imposed what became known as “compulsory budgeting”, reserving substantial resources for allocation by individual members of Congress.
Rousseff won re-election just as the massive “Lava Jato” (Car Wash) corruption scandal became public. Fifteen months later, she fell victim to what many observers characterised as a parliamentary coup. The anti-corruption narrative swept the country, with the problem perceived as systemic and the federal executive branded as the primary culprit. The 2015-2018 legislature proved more hostile to the government than most that had come before. Public prosecutors, the judiciary and the Court of Accounts gained support from national media outlets to create a sense of urgency about the state of governance, which was portrayed as both corrupt and incompetent. After two years of severe recession, Rousseff was removed from office through parliamentary manoeuvres, despite the weakness of the formal accusation — budget irregularities — used to justify her ouster.
The burden of cognitive dissonance
Brazil ranks near the top among countries suffering from cognitive dissonance, according to research by Buffy. Society’s perception of the country fails to match Brazilian realities. The causes are manifold: low educational attainment, media controlled by oligarchical families, a judicial establishment deeply entrenched in protecting its privileges, profound inequalities built over centuries, and weak democratic institutions. The state functions as an instrument of the country’s elite rather than as a representative of society at large. National governance remains fragmented across multiple power centres, few of which demonstrate genuine concern for inclusive and sustainable development.
Since re-democratisation in the mid-1980s, the state has served as the primary arena through which politics is processed. Four decades after the re-establishment of the rule of law, however, the state has proven unable to simultaneously tackle inequality and protect democracy, as documented by the United Nations Development Programme and the Latin American Centre for Development Administration. The events of 2015-2022 revealed the profound fragilities of Brazilian national institutions. The combination of economic, political and social crises produced a severe backlash against the progress achieved in the previous decade.
The Brazilian state has historically been controlled by interest groups connected to the country’s elites. During the centre-left presidencies of 2003-2016 and 2023-2025, social progress was achieved on multiple fronts: poverty elimination, education expansion, environmental protection, healthcare improvements and more. Social participation formed part of these processes through local and national councils that brought ordinary citizens and their representatives into governmental decision-making. Yet these changes proved unsustainable because no structural transformations took place at the fundamental level of power distribution.
Misconceptions about the nature of the Brazilian state — with its three branches of power and three levels of government — have complicated matters further. Brazilian society simply does not understand its own state apparatus. Citizens fail to connect electoral processes with the mandates of political authorities. Not surprisingly, anti-politics sentiment has fuelled authoritarian political forces. Brazil was governed by the extreme right during 2019-2022, and democracy barely survived coup attempts designed to keep Bolsonaro in power and to block Lula’s return to the presidency after his election victory.
Rebuilding from the ruins
Lula created the Ministry of Management and Innovation for Public Services at the beginning of his current mandate. The challenges were formidable: rebuilding governmental structures dismantled by his predecessor, constructing better institutions, and creating new public organisations required to face the country’s contemporary challenges. The government resumed public service recruitment — practically abandoned in previous years — renegotiated public sector salaries to compensate for years of losses, and invested heavily in digital governmental transformation.
The impressive reduction in deforestation rates, the achievement of near-full employment, sustained growth rates of three per cent over three years, and the introduction of progressive tax measures have put the country back on track in a relatively short period. A new generation of social policies has emerged: “More Specialists” in healthcare, “Pé-de-Meia” in education, “Payment for Environmental Services” in environmental protection, and “Ecological Transition” in finance, among others. These initiatives have gained public recognition and support. Social inclusion has remained a permanent concern of the president in his efforts to overcome polarisation and unite the country.
Brazil’s successful presidencies of the G20 and BRICS, combined with achievements in preparing for COP30, have projected Lula as a respected international leader, capable of dealing with challenges including Donald Trump’s tariffs and confusing attitudes towards Latin America and other historical partners.
Brazil faces multiple paradoxes as the country heads towards its next presidential elections. Lula’s potential fourth mandate appears plausible, thanks especially to the resumption of economic growth, poverty reduction, and innovative foreign policy gains. While this has not been sufficient to overcome deep polarisation, it has restored hope and reason to Brazilian politics. The question remains whether these achievements can translate into the structural transformations necessary to break the historical patterns of state capture and inequality that continue to undermine Latin America’s largest democracy.
This article is part of a series on global discussions about the state and government, produced in partnership with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Francisco Gaetani is the Extraordinary Secretary for the Transformation of the State within the Brazilian Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Service (MGI).
