The May 2025 UK-EU summit was widely considered a success: the two sides reiterated their desire for closer ties and agreed a list of areas where new agreements should be struck. However, transforming the commitments contained in the Common Understanding into firm legal texts has proven difficult. Not least because EU member states have taken almost six months to give the green light to formal talks on agri-foods and emissions trading. And negotiations have already started to turn sour over money (and, surprisingly, Scottish oatcakes). Tensions are likely to rise further as we get into the new year, which could dampen enthusiasm for going further.
At this rate, the 2026 summit risks becoming nothing more than a stock-taking exercise. And this would be a waste, not least of an opportunity for the political leadership on both sides to inject a little oomph into proceedings. Consequently, they would be well advised to start thinking about what the next summit might try to achieve.
So far, we know very little about the next meeting—not even when it will happen. The Joint Statement from May says its purpose is “to strengthen our relationship”, and lists three possible functions: “overseeing implementation” of the Withdrawal Agreement and Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA); “driving progress” on the Common Understanding; and “ensuring opportunities for future cooperation are maximised”.
So what could this mean in practice?
Managing sensitive issues
The summit could become a means to manage politically sensitive parts of the existing relationship. This is what happened in May, when agreement on expiring TCA chapters—on fisheries and energy—were a prerequisite for new commitments. Next year, the TCA review and the application of stricter rules of origin for electric vehicles (from January 2027) could form part of the negotiating package.
It is unlikely that the various issues to be negotiated as laid out in the Common Understanding will have been fully negotiated, let alone implemented, by the time the second summit comes around. But having the summit as a target date on which to declare victory would focus minds. The presence of political leaders keen to hail progress made is usually an excellent way of unlocking technical negotiations that might elude compromise at lower levels of the food chain.
Labour might also want to use the summit to give a final push to some of its manifesto promises on touring artists and the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (MRPQs). These failed to gain traction with the EU the first time round and were therefore fudged in the Common Understanding, with the two sides promising to “continue their efforts to support travel and cultural exchange” and to set up a “dedicated dialogue” on MRPQs. As ever, the EU will not offer concessions without getting something it wants in return, so the government should start thinking now about whether it can see the outlines of any kind of package deal.
Matching ambition to the moment
Finally, the two sides should consider whether the initiatives currently being pursued match the scale of the crisis Europeans face in terms of security and competitiveness. The summit could be an opportunity to raise the level of ambition; however, this will be far from easy. On security, the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) was the easy bit. More important, and more difficult, will be finding ways of plugging the UK into EU efforts to strengthen its defence industrial base. The UK is already in talks with the EU about access to its £150 billion defence fund, Security Action for Europe (SAFE). But with funding for Ukraine likely to be a key issue in early 2026, the two sides will need to think about whether SAFE can act as a gateway for further UK integration in the EU’s growing arsenal of defence initiatives.
As long as both sides cling to their red lines, a fundamentally different trading relationship is difficult to envisage. However, there is no shortage of stakeholder demands to further soften the edges of the TCA. These range from calls to facilitate the short-term mobility of professionals to UK membership of the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean (PEM) Convention, to the establishment of a UK-EU Industrial Cooperation Council. The Scottish government has proposed a further thickening of ties, including UK association to Creative Europe and membership of the European Environment Agency.
Whether these form part of the UK ask will depend, above all, on the context at the time. Labour will doubtless get a battering at the local elections in May. A weakened Keir Starmer—and possibly a leadership challenge—would undoubtedly take focus away from relations with the EU. One way of avoiding this scenario could be to hold the summit before 7 May. But even then, the challenge will be persuading the EU that it makes sense to go further.
Nothing about this relationship is going to be easy. But equally, effective planning can help. Treating the summit as an afterthought to be stuck in the diary at the last minute is not the way to ensure tangible progress. Thinking about timing, about ambitions, and about rolling the pitch to achieve those ambitions would be far preferable. The UK and EU need to start that strategic planning now if they want the 2026 summit to deliver substance rather than symbolism.
Jannike Wachowiak is a Research Associate at UK in a Changing Europe. Her research focuses on UK-EU relations, UK-Germany relations and European politics and institutions. She previously worked for the European Policy Centre, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Brussels and London, and the Government of Jersey’s European Relations team.
