Social Europe

politics, economy and employment & labour

  • Books
  • Podcast
  • Videos
    • Spotlight Videos
    • Social Europe Talk
  • Papers
    • Brexit Paper Series
    • Occasional Papers
    • Research Essays
  • Advertise

Does the European Union generate external instability?

by Branko Milanovic on 5th February 2019 @BrankoMilan

TwitterFacebookLinkedinE-mail

The historic achievement of peace within a Europe of universal norms is belied by the external instability engendered by violent and incoherent interventions.

external instability

Branko Milanovic

The European Union is justly admired for making war among its members impossible. This is no small achievement in a continent which was in a state of semi-permanent warfare for the past two millennia.

It is not only that we cannot even imagine the usual 19th and 20th century antagonists, such as France and Germany, going to war ever again. The same is true of other, lesser-known animosities which have led periodically to bloodlettings: between Poles and Germans, Hungarians and Romanians, Greeks and Bulgarians. Unthinkable is also the idea that the United Kingdom and Spain could end up, regarding Gibraltar, in a reprise of the Falklands/Malvinas war.

Destabilised

But creating geopolitical stability internally has not, during the last two decades, been followed by external geopolitical stability along the fringes of the union. Most of the big EU member states (UK, Poland, Italy, Spain) participated, often eagerly, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which led to the deaths of some half a million people, destabilised the middle east even further and produced Islamic State.

Then, seemingly not having learned from this fiasco, France and Italy spearheaded another regime change, this time in Libya. It ended in anarchy, another civil war, two competing governments and a UN Security Council deadlocked for years to come—since it is clear that China and Russia will not in the foreseeable future vote to allow another western military intervention.

The wars along the long arc from Libya to Afghanistan, in which EU powers participated, were the proximate cause of large refugee flows a few years ago, which continue even now. (As I have written elsewhere, the underlying cause of migration is the large gap in incomes between Europe, on the one hand, and Africa and the ‘greater middle east’, on the other, but the sudden outbursts were caused by wars.)

The next example of generating instability was Ukraine, where the then government of Viktor Yanukovych, having only postponed the signing of an EU agreement, was driven out of power in 2014 in a coup-like movement supported by the union. It is sure that a reasonable counterfactual, with the same EU-Ukraine agreements being signed and without a war in eastern Ukraine and with Crimea still part of Ukraine, would have been much preferable to the current situation, which threatens to precipitate a war of even much greater dimensions.

Finally, consider Turkey, in an association agreement with the European Economic Community since 1963, and thus in a membership-awaiting antechamber for more than half a century. The initial period in power of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was marked by pro-European policies, a desire to create an ‘Islamic democracy’, in the mould of the Christian democracies of Italy and Germany, and civilian control over the army. But realisation that, because of its size and probably because of its dominant religion, Turkey would never be recognised as part of Europe led Erdoğan, gradually, to move in an altogether different direction—with an almost zero chance that he would come back to his original pro-European stance.

The endless waiting period, with similarly protracted negotiations over what are now 35 chapters which need to be agreed between candidate countries and all 28 (or soon 27) members, is what lies behind the frustration with the EU in the Balkans. Long gone are the days when Greece could become a member after a couple of months (if that) of negotiations and an agreement between the French president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and the German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. The European bluff—it neither has the stick nor the carrot—albeit long hidden behind the veil of negotiations, was recently called by the Kosovo leadership, when it engaged in a trade war with Serbia. The EU could express its ‘regrets’ but it was squarely ignored. In the past, nether Kosovo nor any other Balkan state would have dared to defy Europe so openly.

Our Most Recent Posts

wage share It is time to restore the wage share Thomas Carlén
democracy in the EU Social discontent and democracy in the EU Guido Montani
European Parliament election European Parliament elections—battle for ‘Europe’s soul’? Miriam Sorace
labour standards Enforcing labour standards via EU free-trade agreements Giovanni Gruni
good governance Democracy splutters—good governance under pressure Christof Schiller

Slow and hesitant

It all means that Europe needs a much better thought-out external policy with respect to its neighbours. There are already some signs that it is moving in that direction but it is doing so too slowly and hesitantly. A multilateral compact with Africa is needed to regulate migration from a continent with the fastest rising population and lowest incomes. Much more European investment—in hard stuff, not conferences—is needed. Rather than complaining about China’s Belt and Road initiative, Europe should imitate it—and, if it desires to counteract Chinese political influence, invest its own money to make more African friends. A similar set of much more proactive policies is required within the framework of the Mediterranean initiative, while military options in the region should be forsworn no less clearly than they are within the union.

When it comes to the potential members, as in the Balkans or the western republics of the former Soviet Union, interminable talks should be replaced by either special association with no expectation of EU membership or clearer, time-limited negotiations leading to membership. Both would manage expectations better and avoid the build-up of resentment and frustration.

The most important challenge is the relationship with Turkey. The EU does not have a blueprint for a Turkey after Erdoğan; nor can it offer anything to the Turkish secular opposition, as it is not clear within itself whether it wants Turkey in or out. It should be rather obvious that a European Turkey, with its vast economic potential and influence in the middle east, would be a huge economic and strategic asset. Such a Turkey would also behave differently in Syria and in Anatolia, because it would have an incentive to follow European rules.

This rethinking of the EU’s neighbourhood policy thus calls, in short, for three things: greater economic aid to Africa, no support for wars or regime change, and much clearer rules and time-limits for membership talks.

TwitterFacebookLinkedinE-mail

About Branko Milanovic

Branko Milanovic is a Serbian-American economist. A development and inequality specialist, he is Visiting Presidential Professor at the Graduate Center of City University of New York (CUNY) and an affiliated senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). He was formerly lead economist in the World Bank's research department.

Social Europe Podcast

Partner Ads

Most Popular Posts

income tax Why top rates of income tax should be much higher Simon Wren-Lewis
Joseph Stiglitz - Beyond GDP Beyond GDP Joseph Stiglitz
external instability Migration Into Europe: A Long-Term Solution? Branko Milanovic
Reversing The Globalisation Backlash Colin Crouch
“New” Perspectives For Europe Jürgen Habermas

Other Social Europe Publications

The Legitimacy of the Brexit Referendum and What We Can Learn from It
Still time to save the euro
Brexit Generation Game: How Conflict Between Old and Young Masks Welfare Challenges
Brexit And Devolution: A New UK Settlement Or The Break-Up Of Britain?
Basic Income And The Left: A European Debate

Social Europe Edition Book

Zygmunt Bauman was a towering intellectual who saw and analysed – right up to his death in early 2017 – the great socio-political changes, often convulsive, in modern western society long before his peers. Here we highlight his prescient insights into what he dubbed ‘liquid modernity’ with 24 chapters on topics ranging from online loneliness via precarity/poverty/inequality to migration, fear of the ‘Other’ and the decline of the nation state. Chronicle of Crisis, 2011-16, written by one of the great chroniclers of our times, will be read and re-read for decades and more to come.


MORE INFO

Hans-Böckler-Stiftung Advertisement

The Positive Economic Impact Of Germany's Statutory Minimum Wage

With the empirical analyses of the macroeconomic effects of the introduction of the statutory minimum wage in Germany, the IMK tries to determine the short-term and expected medium- to long-term growth, price and employment effects with the help of a macro-econometric model. As a result, economic growth tended to be stimulated by the introduction of the minimum wage. This was mainly due to the higher wages of the minimum wage beneficiaries and a spillover effect on adjoining wage groups. In particular, this benefited people whose low savings rate led to a particularly strong increase in real private consumption. The price increases triggered were negligible on a macroeconomic scale.


FREE DOWNLOAD

Social Europe Edition Book

Is an unconditional basic income without means-test or work-test compatible with social justice and individual self-worth? Does it open up the space for an end to demeaning labour and a resurgence of voluntary work and cultural life? Is it affordable? This collection of short but compelling essays, all previously published in Social Europe, allows both proponents and opponents to make their case and is designed to extend this vital discussion to a wider audience.


MORE INFO

ETUI Advertisement

Work in the platform economy

This paper presents a case study of the food delivery platform, Deliveroo, in Belgium in 2016-2018. The case offers insights on the nature of platform work, the workers who perform it, the preferences of workers, the strategy of the platforms, and the role of local regulations. Interestingly, Deliveroo in Belgium employed workers through an intermediary, SMart, and we also observed the termination of their co-operation in the period under analysis. Using administrative data provided by SMart and a survey of workers, we analyse patterns of work and also focus on pay.


FREE DOWNLOAD

Eurofound Advertisement

Energy scenario: Employment implications of the Paris Climate Agreement

This new report shows that the successful transition towards a low-carbon economy, as defined by the Paris Climate Agreement, is projected to result in a 1.1% growth in GDP and a 0.5% growth in employment, in the EU between now and 2030. This is compared to a ‘business as usual’ baseline forecast. Globally, China is also projected to benefit from a low-carbon transition, but the United States would experience a 3.4% drop in GDP, and a 1.6% decline in employment.


FREE DOWNLOAD

S&D Group Advertisement

Sustainable Equality Report. Well-being for everyone in a sustainable Europe

Our societies are in the midst of political, economic, social and ecological crises, which permanently feed into each other, and already undermine democracy. Progressive politics with a common and strong vision are crucially needed. Ahead of the next European elections, the Sustainable Equality Report championed by the S&D Group through its Progressive Society initiative addresses this need, resulting in more than 100 concrete policy proposals by thirty policy-makers and renowned experts.


FREE DOWNLOAD

Find Social Europe content

© Social Europe Publishing & Consulting GmbH 2019

About Social Europe

Mission Statement

Editorial Team & Advisory Board

Article Submission

Legal Disclosure

Privacy Policy

Copyright

Thought Leadership

This website uses cookies to improve your experience and we assume you are ok with this. Do not use this website if you have objections. Accept Read Our Full Privacy Policy