Social Europe

politics, economy and employment & labour

  • Themes
    • Strategic autonomy
    • War in Ukraine
    • European digital sphere
    • Recovery and resilience
  • Publications
    • Books
    • Dossiers
    • Occasional Papers
    • Research Essays
    • Brexit Paper Series
  • Podcast
  • Videos
  • Newsletter

If Biedroń is to help rebuild the Polish left, he has to be the opposite of Macron

Gavin Rae 13th December 2018

rae bio

Gavin Rae

In any article published in the international press about Robert Biedroń, it seems almost obligatory to describe him as the new ‘Polish Macron’. Biedroń recently stood down as mayor of Słupsk to build a new national political party that will stand in next year’s European and parliamentary elections. He is a long-standing left-wing political activist, a former MP and one of the founders and leaders of the country’s LGBT movement. His image as a young and energetic challenger to the political status quo, and his pro-European political stance, have led to comparisons with French President Emmanuel Macron. However, Biedroń and the Polish left should take no inspiration from Macron but forge a different political path.

The Polish left suffered another severe defeat October’s local elections. Its two main parties, the Democratic Left Alliance and Razem, scored just 6.6 percent and 1.6 percent respectively. These elections were once again dominated by two parties from the right. The ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) confirmed its position as the country’s dominant political party, although its vote was concentrated predominantly in the countryside and small towns. Meanwhile, the main opposition party, Citizens’ Platform (PO) (standing in these elections as Citizens’ Coalition), won support mainly in the large cities. Despite this dominance, independent candidates fared well in these elections, particularly in small- and medium-sized cities, showing the limits to the right’s dominance and the potential for the growth of a new united movement of the left.

The main organised political opposition to PiS is concentrated in Poland’s major cities and promotes a liberal alternative to the government. There has been huge pressure placed upon the left to assimilate itself into a united opposition movement, in order ostensibly to prevent the conservative and authoritarian PiS from winning a second term in office. Parts of the left have already been lured by such arguments, with the well-known centre-left politician Barbara Nowacka, and some of her supporters, joining PO’s electoral coalition during the local poll. However, PiS has managed to craft a political image as the party that protects the living standards of the poorer sections of society against a liberal elite. Meanwhile the liberal ‘centre’ is becoming ever more congested, with the banker and former leader of the party Modern, Ryszard Petru, launching a new political party named (without irony) Now.

Macron no thanks 

Opposition to the PiS government, amongst the liberal urban electorate, has reached its limits.

It is for this reason, and the failures of Macron whilst in power, that the Polish left should reject the strategy of trying to replicate his political movement. Macron’s political base is situated within the wealthiest sections of society. For example, during the first round of Presidential elections, he won 36 percent support among those earning more than €3,500 a month, yet only 12 percent of those with an income below €1,500. He also scored particularly well amongst managers and company directors but poorly among workers. PO and its satellite parties already monopolise such an electorate in Poland, which is attracted to their liberal economic programme.

In order to rebuild itself the Polish left has to look elsewhere for support, particularly within the small and medium cities, where both PiS and PO suffered significant losses. There are some signs that Biedroń is attempting to pursue such an alternative strategy. After the first round of local government elections he held up a map of Poland that showed how PiS were dominant in the poorer eastern regions of the country; and another displaying how the network of rail lines is much less developed in these areas. His message was clear: inequalities and under-investment have led to large sections of the electorate turning to PiS. He has also spent the past couple of months travelling around Poland and holding large political meetings in different regions. He is thus trying to reach out to an electorate that the ‘liberal opposition’ either ignores or has no access to.

What’s left?

Rejecting the path of Macron is not just about electoral strategy, but also touches the very heart of what it means to be left. Macron has introduced an economic programme of austerity and privatisation that has hit society’s poorest the hardest. He has instigated an upward redistribution of wealth, with the richest one percent of society capturing 44 percent of the tax breaks. These policies have resulted in a wave of social protests, organised against the economic policies of Macron and the French government. Concurrently, polls show that his approval rating has slumped in recent months, with less than 30 percent satisfied with the French President’s performance.  The neoliberal policies of Macron not only contradict the values of the left, but also erode the support of politicians who implement them.

Between PiS and Macron

The building of a pro-European progressive left in Poland faces a number of dilemmas. PiS is not primarily focused on taking Poland out of the EU (Polexit) but rather on attempting to transform it in a more rightward direction. Meanwhile, ‘pro-European’ politicians such as Macron look to create a more deregulated, neoliberal EU, which would be detrimental to the poorer member states to the east. This includes Macron’s push for a multi-speed European Union, which would likely force Poland to the side-lines of a more exclusive economic club.

The exact political character of Biedroń’s new political party, which is set to be formally launched in February, is unclear. So far his movement has no clear political identity, with both social democrats and liberals supporting and advising it. If, however, it is to be successful, he will have to endeavour to unite the disparate parts of the left and reach out to voters who are dissatisfied by the two right-wing parties that have monopolised Poland’s politics for nearly a decade and a half. Any successful left-wing force in Poland is going to have to offer an alternative to the right-wing nationalism of PiS and the neoliberalism of European politicians such as Macron.

Gavin Rae

Gavin Rae is a sociologist in Warsaw. He has written extensively on the political and social changes in Poland and central and eastern Europe, including Poland's Return to Capitalism: From the Socialist Bloc to the European Union and Public Capital: The Commodification of Poland's Welfare State.

You are here: Home / Politics / If Biedroń is to help rebuild the Polish left, he has to be the opposite of Macron

Most Popular Posts

Russian soldiers' mothers,war,Ukraine The Ukraine war and Russian soldiers’ mothersJennifer Mathers and Natasha Danilova
IGU,documents,International Gas Union,lobby,lobbying,sustainable finance taxonomy,green gas,EU,COP ‘Gaslighting’ Europe on fossil fuelsFaye Holder
Schengen,Fortress Europe,Romania,Bulgaria Romania and Bulgaria stuck in EU’s second tierMagdalena Ulceluse
income inequality,inequality,Gini,1 per cent,elephant chart,elephant Global income inequality: time to revise the elephantBranko Milanovic
Orbán,Hungary,Russia,Putin,sanctions,European Union,EU,European Parliament,commission,funds,funding Time to confront Europe’s rogue state—HungaryStephen Pogány

Most Recent Posts

reality check,EU foreign policy,Russia Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—a reality check for the EUHeidi Mauer, Richard Whitman and Nicholas Wright
permanent EU investment fund,Recovery and Resilience Facility,public investment,RRF Towards a permanent EU investment fundPhilipp Heimberger and Andreas Lichtenberger
sustainability,SDGs,Finland Embedding sustainability in a government programmeJohanna Juselius
social dialogue,social partners Social dialogue must be at the heart of Europe’s futureClaes-Mikael Ståhl
Jacinda Ardern,women,leadership,New Zealand What it means when Jacinda Ardern calls timePeter Davis

Other Social Europe Publications

front cover scaled Towards a social-democratic century?
Cover e1655225066994 National recovery and resilience plans
Untitled design The transatlantic relationship
Women Corona e1631700896969 500 Women and the coronavirus crisis
sere12 1 RE No. 12: Why No Economic Democracy in Sweden?

Eurofound advertisement

Eurofound webinar: Making telework work for everyone

Since 2020 more European workers and managers have enjoyed greater flexibility and autonomy in work and are reporting their preference for hybrid working. Also driven by technological developments and structural changes in employment, organisations are now integrating telework more permanently into their workplace.

To reflect on these shifts, on 6 December Eurofound researchers Oscar Vargas and John Hurley explored the challenges and opportunities of the surge in telework, as well as the overall growth of telework and teleworkable jobs in the EU and what this means for workers, managers, companies and policymakers.


WATCH THE WEBINAR HERE

Foundation for European Progressive Studies Advertisement

The winter issue of the Progressive Post magazine from FEPS is out!

The sequence of recent catastrophes has thrust new words into our vocabulary—'polycrisis', for example, even 'permacrisis'. These challenges have multiple origins, reinforce each other and cannot be tackled individually. But could they also be opportunities for the EU?

This issue offers compelling analyses on the European health union, multilateralism and international co-operation, the state of the union, political alternatives to the narrative imposed by the right and much more!


DOWNLOAD HERE

Hans Böckler Stiftung Advertisement

The macroeconomic effects of re-applying the EU fiscal rules

Against the background of the European Commission's reform plans for the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), this policy brief uses the macroeconometric multi-country model NiGEM to simulate the macroeconomic implications of the most relevant reform options from 2024 onwards. Next to a return to the existing and unreformed rules, the most prominent options include an expenditure rule linked to a debt anchor.

Our results for the euro area and its four biggest economies—France, Italy, Germany and Spain—indicate that returning to the rules of the SGP would lead to severe cuts in public spending, particularly if the SGP rules were interpreted as in the past. A more flexible interpretation would only somewhat ease the fiscal-adjustment burden. An expenditure rule along the lines of the European Fiscal Board would, however, not necessarily alleviate that burden in and of itself.

Our simulations show great care must be taken to specify the expenditure rule, such that fiscal consolidation is achieved in a growth-friendly way. Raising the debt ceiling to 90 per cent of gross domestic product and applying less demanding fiscal adjustments, as proposed by the IMK, would go a long way.


DOWNLOAD HERE

ILO advertisement

Global Wage Report 2022-23: The impact of inflation and COVID-19 on wages and purchasing power

The International Labour Organization's Global Wage Report is a key reference on wages and wage inequality for the academic community and policy-makers around the world.

This eighth edition of the report, The Impact of inflation and COVID-19 on wages and purchasing power, examines the evolution of real wages, giving a unique picture of wage trends globally and by region. The report includes evidence on how wages have evolved through the COVID-19 crisis as well as how the current inflationary context is biting into real wage growth in most regions of the world. The report shows that for the first time in the 21st century real wage growth has fallen to negative values while, at the same time, the gap between real productivity growth and real wage growth continues to widen.

The report analysis the evolution of the real total wage bill from 2019 to 2022 to show how its different components—employment, nominal wages and inflation—have changed during the COVID-19 crisis and, more recently, during the cost-of-living crisis. The decomposition of the total wage bill, and its evolution, is shown for all wage employees and distinguishes between women and men. The report also looks at changes in wage inequality and the gender pay gap to reveal how COVID-19 may have contributed to increasing income inequality in different regions of the world. Together, the empirical evidence in the report becomes the backbone of a policy discussion that could play a key role in a human-centred recovery from the different ongoing crises.


DOWNLOAD HERE

ETUI advertisement

The EU recovery strategy: a blueprint for a more Social Europe or a house of cards?

This new ETUI paper explores the European Union recovery strategy, with a focus on its potentially transformative aspects vis-à-vis European integration and its implications for the social dimension of the EU’s socio-economic governance. In particular, it reflects on whether the agreed measures provide sufficient safeguards against the spectre of austerity and whether these constitute steps away from treating social and labour policies as mere ‘variables’ of economic growth.


DOWNLOAD HERE

About Social Europe

Our Mission

Article Submission

Membership

Advertisements

Legal Disclosure

Privacy Policy

Copyright

Social Europe ISSN 2628-7641

Social Europe Archives

Search Social Europe

Themes Archive

Politics Archive

Economy Archive

Society Archive

Ecology Archive

Follow us

RSS Feed

Follow us on Facebook

Follow us on Twitter

Follow us on LinkedIn

Follow us on YouTube