Vladimir Putin does not want peace in Ukraine—not even on the exceptionally favourable terms for Russia that Donald Trump appears prepared to impose upon Ukrainians and Europeans alike. For several weeks now, this reality has become clear to almost all informed observers, except, it would seem, to Donald Trump himself, who continues to conduct himself as though Vladimir Putin were negotiating in good faith.
How can we explain the Russian president’s refusal to grasp the olive branch extended by an American president who, even before any formal negotiations commence, stands ready to recognise Russian sovereignty over conquered territories and prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, whilst largely abandoning responsibility for its future trajectory?
Several converging explanations illuminate this ostensibly puzzling behaviour.
Putin seeks total Belarusianisation of Ukraine
Firstly, Vladimir Putin possesses little genuine interest in the Donbas and Luhansk regions themselves. These territories now lie devastated, their infrastructure reduced to ruins—as evidenced by the current acute shortage of drinking water. Their economies were dominated by coal mining and largely obsolete heavy industries that will contribute precious little to Russia’s economic future.
Territorial continuity with Crimea and complete control over the Sea of Azov represent significant gains for Russian imperialism. Nevertheless, these acquisitions remain secondary to Vladimir Putin’s primary war objective: gaining control over Ukraine as a whole by transforming it into another Belarus, reintegrating it fully into Russia’s sphere of influence without necessarily requiring complete military occupation.
A democratic Ukraine, flourishing as a member of the European Union and developing economically as rapidly as Poland has done, would remain—in Putin’s calculations—far too dangerous a threat to his autocratic and kleptocratic regime, regardless of territorial losses it might suffer.
In autocratic regimes such as Putin’s, delivering honest assessments to leaders often proves perilous for those brave enough to attempt it. Despite the serious military setbacks his armies have endured over three gruelling years—hundreds of thousands of soldiers killed and maimed, thousands of tanks destroyed—Putin remains flattered by the courtiers surrounding him and systematically misinformed by his generals’ misleading reports.
These military briefings consistently underestimate Russian losses whilst embellishing successes in equal measure. Vladimir Putin therefore probably continues to believe that Russian forces stand on the verge of decisive military victory and that Ukrainian resistance will soon collapse if he maintains relentless pressure.
The same dynamic applies to assessments of Russia’s economic condition, whose technocratic leaders certainly attempt to conceal from Putin the extent of structural decay and the mounting impact of Western sanctions. This information ecosystem creates a structural tendency for Putin to believe his position far stronger than reality suggests.
Peace would threaten his regime’s survival
Since 2022, the Russian president has reoriented Russia’s entire economy towards wartime production whilst channelling all political rhetoric towards imperial conquest. In this context, peace in Ukraine would constitute a major destabilising factor for Putin’s grip on power, given its inevitable economic and social consequences.
The salaries paid to soldiers fighting in Ukraine vastly exceed those available in Russia’s civilian economy. Military wages thus help mitigate war’s economic consequences for the most vulnerable populations, particularly in the country’s impoverished regions. Peace would starkly expose the extent of deterioration within Russia’s civilian economy and the massive accumulated effects of insufficient investment in basic infrastructure maintenance since 2022.
Furthermore, peace would generate serious social and political tensions accompanying the return to civilian life of hundreds of thousands of demobilised veterans. Many suffer from alcoholism or drug addiction and frequently carry untreated communicable diseases including AIDS, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis. They have witnessed the front line’s horrors and experienced the complete absence of moral constraints or rule of law within Russian military ranks. Accounts of how Russian officers treat their subordinates make for chilling reading.
The reintegration of these veterans into Russian society, accompanied by all the violence such a process would inevitably entail, would prove a far more formidable challenge than even America’s difficult experience with Vietnam War veterans. These returning soldiers would also contribute little towards addressing Russia’s increasingly acute shortage of skilled labour.
In all these respects, Vladimir Putin possesses compelling incentives to continue the war regardless of military outcomes on the ground.
China opposes any Pax Americana in Ukraine
Finally, despite everything Donald Trump appears willing to concede, Vladimir Putin cannot afford to grant the American president an opportunity to appear as the statesman who ended the Ukrainian war—and who might therefore deserve Nobel Prize recognition for peacemaking.
Through this conflict, Russia has become profoundly dependent upon China for most essential supplies and for purchasing its gas and oil exports. Weakened by prolonged warfare, Russia teeters on the brink of becoming Beijing’s vassal state, notwithstanding its nuclear arsenal and its president’s grandiose imperial aspirations.
However, within the broader context of Sino-American rivalry, Xi Jinping cannot tolerate either genuine, lasting rapprochement between Russia and the United States or any strengthening of Trump’s position on the international stage. Beijing probably also seeks to maintain a persistent source of distraction for Western powers in Europe, preventing them from concentrating their forces on containing Chinese expansion in Asia.
Even if Putin genuinely desired to make peace in Ukraine under Trump’s auspices—which, for the reasons outlined above, seems highly improbable—he would likely prove unable to do so because Xi Jinping would almost certainly intervene to prevent such an outcome.
In summary, for all these converging reasons, only decisive military defeat on the ground, combined with strengthened economic sanctions against Russia, could ultimately compel Vladimir Putin to cease hostilities in Ukraine.
First published by Institut Jacques Delors
Guillaume Duval is adviser to the Jacques Delors Institute, former editor-in-chief of Alternatives Economiques and former speechwriter of HRVP Josep Borell.
