- Two files, one signal: The ETS reform and the electrification plan together reveal how far the EU will still push decarbonisation.
- Retreat or advance: Framing the ETS as a burden on business, rather than as green industrial finance, would mark a political climbdown.
- An electrification gap: The EU must climb from a 24 per cent electrification rate to at least 32 per cent by 2030.
- Public opinion is ready: Research across 15 states shows strong support for clean energy over a return to Russian supplies.
- Narrative decides: The transition depends as much on the storytelling and the public deals built around it as on the measures themselves.
It has been a scorching start to the summer in Europe. Much media coverage has centred on the heat itself, with temperatures climbing well above 40 degrees centigrade in the south. But the question of why it is so hot — and the clear evidence of global warming behind it — has not been lost on the European public this time.
Translating that growing urgency into action is another matter, given that Europe’s political centre is running scared from the idea that an overt green agenda could reignite the “greenlash”. The energy package the European Commission will release shortly is an important weathervane: it will show how far European leaders are willing to harness the momentum of this summer’s reminder of what is at stake. Climate change is here, and it carries real consequences for European citizens.
As part of a broader package, the Commission is expected to present proposals to reform the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) — the world’s first and largest carbon market — alongside an electrification action plan aimed at shifting industry, transport, and heating away from fossil fuels and towards electricity, ahead of the Energy Council meeting in October. Both files carry major implications for the next phase of the EU’s green transition. The level of ambition in each will reflect and underline European policymakers’ thinking about what is feasible on decarbonisation in the current political environment.
The Emissions Trading Scheme has been in place in the EU since 2005, and its revenues represent a major source of industrial transition finance in member states. It is nevertheless a bête noire — particularly in central and eastern European states — misunderstood as a cost imposed on member states in the name of climate action, by a distant Brussels. Originally intended to improve the scheme’s effectiveness and extend its coverage, the Commission’s forthcoming proposal is now expected to focus on more modest changes. These include expanding the scheme within sectors already covered, such as maritime transport and aviation, closing any remaining gaps, and possibly delaying the phase-out of free allocations. Whether the package is framed as “easing the burden of the ETS on business”, or as strengthening the scheme’s contribution to decarbonisation — and its revenue-raising for green industrial policy — will be a crucial indicator of whether European policymakers see this as a moment of advance or retreat on the climate agenda.
The electrification action plan will be a second tone-setter for how the Commission wants to frame the green agenda in this political moment. It will underpin the EU’s effort to reach an electrification rate of at least 32 per cent by 2030 — a target set out in the Clean Industrial Deal in 2025. When that target was set, the EU stood at around 24 per cent electrification of final energy consumption. Closing the gap will require major changes, including grid investment, better interconnections between member states, and faster permitting.
Unlike the ETS, the electrification action plan carries no difficult reputation in European public opinion. Indeed, ECFR public opinion research across 15 European states in May 2026 showed strong support for investing in clean energy and renewables as an alternative to returning to Russian energy sources. Those findings also reflected concern about the vulnerability of fossil fuel supplies to chaotic geopolitics — including this year’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resulting impact on energy prices. The test here will be whether sufficient resources can be mobilised to make the plan’s ambitions credible, given the many competing demands on EU resources and on the budget, and the concerns of wealthier, net-contributor member states about keeping EU spending under control.
The success or failure of the next phase of the green transition will lie as much in the tone of the storytelling — and the deals with the European public built around them — as in the measures proposed. In today’s polarised, fragmented European politics, the 2019 centrist consensus that delivering the green transition is both necessary and achievable has broken down. Yet the growing frequency and severity of climate impacts across Europe offer an opportunity for the EU to re-evaluate and reset the political debate.
Rather than seeking to recreate the coalition of 2019, the EU should use this moment to develop a new political approach to decarbonisation that reflects today’s political and economic realities. This does not mean retreating from the green agenda. Businesses, families, and global partners need confidence that governments remain committed to decarbonisation, so that they can plan and invest. But it does require a clearer political narrative — one that shows how decarbonisation also strengthens Europe’s security, competitiveness, and quality of life. It requires flexibility in implementation to reflect national and local circumstances and needs, alongside investment that brings the benefits of the transition forward for all citizens, while sharing the costs more fairly.
How the Commission presents this summer’s energy package will be an early and telling test of whether European policymakers have built a political strategy fit for the realities of today — or are simply defending yesterday’s consensus.
