Ukraine stands at a crossroads: as the war grinds on with devastating costs, the path to a ceasefire may lie in difficult compromises.
After more than 1,000 days of war, with countless dead and wounded, destroyed infrastructure, and bombed-out homes, villages, and cities, Ukraine faces a choice: either negotiate a ceasefire from a position of weakness or attempt a decisive turnaround on the battlefield. The latter, however, is hardly conceivable without more Western weapons and, bluntly put, Western troops.
Despite Western humanitarian, financial, and military aid, the situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate. Meanwhile, the spiral of escalation persists—both in real and rhetorical terms. While it remains crucial to remember who initiated this conflict, who is the aggressor and who is the defender, in the logic of war, it ultimately does not matter who started it. The logic of war demands ever more soldiers and ever heavier weapons until the enemy is defeated. Generals, in turn, often assure politicians that victory is possible with increasingly determined military action.
This escalation has only been slowed because the West fears the ultimate risk of a major war, potentially involving nuclear weapons, should Russia see no other way to avert defeat. Those advocating for Ukraine to be given everything it needs, including the freedom to strike targets deep within Russia with Western missiles, consider Putin’s nuclear threat a mere bluff. However, the longer the war drags on, the more a certain nonchalance towards the risk of nuclear weapons use emerges among those favouring unconditional military support—partly due to a refusal to appear intimidated by Putin.
Every empty threat increases the risk that Russia could eventually conclude that action must follow words to be taken seriously. It is unwise for the West to assume that Putin himself knows the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be folly. Common sense dictates that we must consider our opponent’s distorted worldview. Christoph Heusgen, head of the Munich Security Conference, recently argued on Deutschlandfunk radio that Putin’s nuclear threats should not be taken seriously because China has declared its opposition to such an escalation. This position seems naive, relying on the assumption that the West need not fear Putin’s threats because Xi Jinping will intervene to protect us.
Understanding when Putin is bluffing and when he may feel compelled to resort to the ultimate escalation is one of the most challenging decisions for political leaders. This is likely the main reason why President Biden and, subsequently, Chancellor Scholz have expanded arms supplies only gradually, rather than committing to unlimited military aid. Whatever one may think of this cautious approach, it is not a strategy for the future, as Ukraine is visibly bleeding dry in this war of attrition and can sustain it for only a limited period.
The question of additional soldiers is the Achilles heel of the Ukrainian resistance, and it is even more pressing than the need for more weapons. Increasingly, reports point to the total exhaustion of Ukrainian troops, severe recruitment problems, and growing desertion or avoidance of conscription through flight and corruption. Unlike Putin, Ukraine does not have authoritarian allies who can simply send young men to the front without regard for domestic sentiment or public concerns.
If Ukraine is to win, or at least negotiate from a position of strength, it will require not only Western weaponry but also Western soldiers. According to Le Monde, the UK and France are considering such a move, though it is more likely to involve trainers, technical maintenance of weapons, and possibly fighters from private security firms like Blackwater. It is difficult to imagine that Ukraine’s allies will find the political support necessary to send their own troops into the conflict.
Realising that western troops are at least for the foreseeable future out of question, President Zelenskyy has likely decided, given the current front line situation and Donald Trump’s return to the White House, to abandon the goal of liberating occupied territories and instead seek a ceasefire along current lines, along with NATO membership for Ukraine.
Negative front line developments and Trump’s eagerness to end the war have forced as well as enabled Zelenskyy to pursue path between escalation and surrender, despite strong nationalist forces in Ukraine that insist on continuing the fight until all occupied territories are liberated.
The chances of freezing the conflict might have been better in 2022, after the liberation of Kherson, than they are now, when Ukraine must negotiate from a position of weakness. All the more reason for the West to act decisively now, so that Zelenskyy’s difficult but correct decision opens the door to saving Ukraine rather than delivering a Russian victory.
Donald Trump’s presidency may offer an opportunity for a ceasefire. He has a clear and straightforward message: Putin can either choose a ceasefire, in which he retains the territories he has conquered while allowing for a free and independent Ukraine, or face an escalation of the war. No one—not even Putin—can be certain how Trump will react if this offer is rejected. It is, however, safe to assume that Trump will not want to start his presidency with a defeat. Europe should firmly support Trump’s efforts to secure a ceasefire, while insisting that not only the weapons fall silent but also that the security of a free Ukraine is assured.
Given its own military shortcomings, Europe has little choice but to offer Trump the option of assuming the lion’s share of the financial burden for both maintaining a security framework to guarantee the ceasefire and, if necessary, ramping up arms supplies should the ceasefire fail. From both a European and Ukrainian perspective, any solution must include security guarantees for Ukraine. If direct NATO membership is not feasible due to Russian resistance or disagreements within NATO itself, major European powers will need to step up, providing credible security assurances in cooperation with the United States.
But is there any willingness on the Russian side to negotiate? Is Putin prepared to abandon his maximalist demands for regime change and the disarmament of Ukraine? It is impossible to judge from the outside whether the prospect of a ceasefire will shift public sentiment in Russia and embolden more voices to speak out against the war. It remains to be seen whether relatively neutral states such as India, Brazil, and South Africa—and even China—will encourage Russia to negotiate in light of Ukraine’s proposal.
For Putin, Zelenskyy’s proposal represents an opportunity to end the war, which is also costly for Russia and has resulted in numerous casualties. The unpredictability of Trump might be a risk Putin is unwilling to face. In any case, Zelenskyy’s concession can only lead to ceasefire negotiations if Putin believes Ukraine will not soon be forced to capitulate regardless. Europe must therefore leave no doubt about its firm support for Ukraine.
Europe will need to mobilise hundreds of billions of Euros for this effort. Trump will only provide protection against Putin in exchange for substantial financial compensation, if at all. Attempting to finance solidarity with Ukraine by cutting necessary investments in infrastructure, climate action, and social justice will only fuel the arguments of those who want the war to end, regardless of Ukraine’s fate. For Germany, this means either suspending its debt brake or increasing state revenues, perhaps through a one-off 10 per cent ‘freedom tax’ on all assets above one million euros.
The price for a ceasefire based on military realities would thus be threefold: Ukraine would lose 20 percent of its territory, at least temporarily; Europe would pay billions for American military assistance; and Donald Trump, possibly the most dangerous adversary of American democracy, would score a significant foreign policy victory. Given the alternatives, this remains the glimmer of hope between capitulation and Armageddon.
Frank Hoffer is non-executive director of the Global Labour University Online Academy.