Europe’s Made in Europe Label Shuts Out Morocco and Turkey

Headline options: 1. Europe’s Made in Europe Label Shuts Out Morocco and Turkey · 2. Paris and Berlin Have Just Pushed the Mediterranean Further Away · 3. Friendshoring Dies Quietly in the Franco-German Car Deal

The European institutions, the Council and the Parliament, are currently finalising their positions on the Industrial Accelerator Act, a proposal put forward by the European Commission last March. Its aim is to boost European industrial production, particularly in sectors linked to the energy transition and the phase-out of fossil fuels, with the objective of raising industry’s share of European GDP from 14 per cent in 2024 to 20 per cent in 2035.

The proposal aims to speed up approval procedures for low-carbon industrial projects, impose rules on European content and labour for foreign investments exceeding 100 million euros, and, finally, require “Made in Europe” and low-carbon production criteria in public procurement and subsidy programmes across European countries.

It is this last point, the definition of the “Made in Europe” requirements, that is sparking the most debate. This is particularly true of electric cars, a crucial issue for the future of the European automotive sector, now under serious threat from the spectacular rise of a Chinese automotive industry that has pulled far ahead in this field.

Until now, the approaches taken by France and Germany, two of Europe’s leading car-producing nations, have differed significantly on this issue. This is largely because German industry has invested far more in China than French industry has. The German government consequently feared retaliatory measures that would harm German interests in China should Europe adopt overly strict rules in this area. German manufacturers, who are less well placed than their French counterparts in electric vehicles, also wanted an additional grace period for the production of vehicles with internal combustion engines, rather than the 2035 deadline previously set out in the Green Deal.

A Bargain Struck Over Emissions and Origin

On 15 October, the French and German governments reached an agreement on this key issue. France accepted the German request to relax the rules for vehicles by the 2035 deadline: instead of the 100 per cent reduction in CO₂ emissions from new vehicles currently stipulated in the Green Deal, the reduction may be as low as 90 per cent, without manufacturers needing to offset the remaining 10 per cent, contrary to what the European Commission had initially proposed. In exchange, Germany accepted a narrower definition of “Made in Europe”, limiting eligibility for the label to production in the United Kingdom and Norway in addition to the 27 member states of the EU.

One of the sticking points in the Franco-German negotiations concerned the inclusion of Morocco and Turkey, two countries that are home to three of the main factories of the Renault and Stellantis groups, alongside Norway and the United Kingdom on the list of countries eligible for the “Made in Europe” label. Ultimately, the French government relented on this point and accepted that production in these two countries would not be eligible for the subsidies or the preferential access to public procurement associated with the “Made in Europe” label.

One might wonder, however, whether this is not a potentially major strategic error, not only for France but for Europe as a whole. And this applies not only economically but also, more broadly, in geopolitical terms.

Europe must, of course, do more to protect its market against the steamroller of Chinese overcapacity, heavily subsidised by the Party-State. We must act to ensure that European car manufacturers remain competitive against their Chinese counterparts, not only within the EU27’s internal market but also in third-country markets, particularly those of the rapidly growing Global South. This does, however, mean that these manufacturers must integrate into their value chains, and those of their subcontractors, countries where costs are significantly lower than our own.

We must therefore encourage not only production within Europe itself but also what is known as “friendshoring”, the localisation of production in friendly and neighbouring countries, as opposed to “offshoring”, the relocation of production to distant, and frequently Asian, locations, which has been practised on a large scale over recent decades and has cost Europe industrial control. In this regard, Morocco and Turkey are clearly potential partners that deserve to be given priority by Europe and its car manufacturers.

Thirty Years of Mediterranean Promises

Beyond the strictly economic aspect, the European Union has, since 1995 and the Barcelona Declaration, prided itself on its desire to make the Mediterranean “a shared area of peace, stability and prosperity, through the strengthening of political and security dialogue, and of economic, financial, social and cultural cooperation”. This commitment has been ritually reiterated every year since then at meetings of the Union for the Mediterranean, and it was solemnly reaffirmed once again when the European Commission presented a new, major “Pact for the Mediterranean” in October 2025. Furthermore, as part of its migration policy (or, more accurately, its anti-migration policy), the Union constantly reiterates that one of the most effective ways of limiting the arrival of irregular migrants on its territory is to give greater support to the economic development of its partner countries, so as to create more jobs there.

However, when the opportunity arises to match words with deeds, as with this question of which countries outside the EU27 could be associated with the “Made in Europe” initiative, there is no one to be found. This is true even for partners as solid and as close to the EU as Morocco and Turkey have been for decades. Meanwhile, the main casualty of the ongoing haggling over the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework for 2028–2035 is likely to be, as usual, the “Global Europe” envelope, the budget allocated to development aid for our partners in the South.

Under these circumstances, is it any wonder that our partners in the southern Mediterranean are increasingly turning their backs on us and drawing closer, economically as well as geopolitically, to our Chinese and Russian adversaries and competitors?