Social democracy can’t survive without vision. The SPD must rediscover its purpose and emotional power.
The bitter end of Olaf Scholz’s unpopular “traffic light” coalition government dashed any short-term hopes of success. But the SPD’s fundamental problems go far beyond a single lost election. The 2025 German federal election merely marked the lowest point to date in a trend that has persisted for more than two decades – and it is not limited to Germany. Social democracy is suffering from a loss of trust that dates back to the 1990s.
At that time, the previously valid social democratic programme was deemed outdated and discarded. This was not just about a shift in policy content. The way politics was understood and conducted also changed. The ambition to actively shape the future, guided by a normative vision of a better society, gave way to a concept of politics based on forming temporary voter coalitions. The goal became to identify the perceived interests of specific social groups and cater to them in a tailored manner.
This seemingly pragmatic approach – best described as “transactional” due to its business-like nature – was superficially successful in the short term. Gerhard Schröder replaced Helmut Kohl as Chancellor, and “New Labour” under Tony Blair governed the UK for over a decade. But this supposed formula for success is increasingly proving to be a boomerang. For at least four major reasons, it no longer works today.
First, the assumption that voting decisions are purely rational – the foundation of transactional politics – was always a myth. Other important factors like the desire for change, emotions, and the appeal of individual candidates also play key roles. In both Germany and the UK, a strong mood for change after years of conservative rule, combined with the personal charisma of Schröder and Blair, played a significant – possibly decisive – role in their electoral victories. The actual impact of the changed political strategy may have been overestimated.
Second, social structures have changed since the 1990s. In Western democracies, traditional social milieus – and with them, political loyalties – have steadily eroded. It has become increasingly difficult and fragmented to identify social groups with supposedly homogeneous interests and address them politically. Real-life environments are more diverse, interest constellations more contradictory, and often less stable than assumed. Under these conditions, the transactional approach leads us astray, as it presupposes a homogeneity and predictability of voter groups that no longer exists.
British sociologist Colin Crouch has vividly described how secularisation and the decline of industrial labour have contributed to the dissolution of political allegiances. This is particularly evident in the voting behaviour of young people: in the 2021 German federal election, they mostly voted for the Greens and the liberal FDP, while four years later, the Left and the right-wing extremist AfD were ahead. Political allegiances are especially volatile in this age cohort – a trend that provides clues about future developments. According to Crouch, as traditional milieus fade, political competition increasingly resembles rival supermarket chains competing for customers. Politics becomes a special offer.
Third, decades of transactional politics have led to a profound loss of identity and trust for social democracy. When politics is primarily seen as a string of offers to different interest groups, it loses its overarching compass. Policy proposals, strung together over time, no longer add up to a coherent whole. The fundamental question – what does social democracy actually stand for, what are its long-term goals for tomorrow’s society – can no longer be convincingly answered. This lack of a clear, recognisable identity is fatal in today’s context, which is shaped by uncertainty and rapid change.
Fourth, the level at which political competition takes place has shifted. With the rise of right-wing populism, politics has become increasingly emotionalised. Aristotle’s classical distinction of what makes a persuasive speech – and by extension successful politics – offers useful insight here: ethos (credibility and character), pathos (emotional appeal), and logos (rational argument and content).
Right-wing populists clearly and often successfully conduct their political battles using pathos. They stoke fear, mobilise anger, offer simplistic solutions, and appeal to gut feelings. Few people would vote for them based on rational arguments alone. Transactional social democracy, however, tends to rely too heavily on logos – pointing to higher minimum wages or promising “more net income for you” as happened in the recent German election campaign. These are important policy goals, but they operate on the wrong level and often fail to resonate. An emotional attack cannot be countered by rationality alone.
This mismatch becomes especially clear in migration policy. After Britain’s Labour Party recently lost a by-election to Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced a tough stance to reduce net migration. If the German experience serves as a guide, this approach will fail. Why? Because setting a quantitative reduction target suggests that the issue can be solved rationally – that it will disappear once a certain number is reached.
In Germany, the number of asylum applications had already significantly declined before the federal election – without any noticeable political impact. The reason: reaching a specific number doesn’t solve the real problem. What must be addressed is the emotional perception that the state has lost control of its borders. In Germany, this is not about immigration per se. Unlike in the UK, freedom of movement within the EU was never a contentious issue. The real question is how to reconcile openness with control in a politically credible way.
So, what needs to be done?
The diagnosis makes clear that continuing with transactional strategies will not lead the SPD out of its crisis. What is needed instead is a fundamental reorientation. The emotional, often disruptive and backward-looking worldview of right-wing populists must be met on the same emotional level with something powerful and positive: a renewed social democratic vision for the 21st century. This vision must inspire hope for the future, build on the traditional social democratic promise of progress, and skillfully integrate ethos, pathos, and logos.
It must not be developed in a vacuum, but grounded in the real lives of ordinary people. Their concerns and hopes deserve to be taken seriously. That is why the renewal of social democracy must place special emphasis on municipalities and local communities. This is where contact with daily life is most direct and tangible. The future begins locally.
The new policy orientation must also not remain vague – it must be translated into concrete, comprehensible goals and projects. It must provide guidance and a timeline that clearly extends beyond a single legislative period, without postponing the idea of a better society to a distant future.
This is about shaping long-term development paths rooted in values – not about short-term political tactics. One potential starting point could be the €500 billion special fund for infrastructure. What should Germany look like in 2040 once those funds have been spent? What should have been achieved politically, economically, and socially by then? These are the kinds of questions worth thinking about.
It is also important that a new future vision is socially integrative. We need a new kind of social glue. A new social democratic societal vision must be broadly compelling and capable of uniting very different people in a shared political project.
A clear, long-term vision could also ease the sometimes tense relationship between governing and party work – transforming it into a productive tension. If the political horizon stretches beyond the lifespan of a government, the party gains space to focus on articulating a broader vision for the future. It can explain how current government actions represent steps in the right direction, while also acknowledging that compromises are inevitable in a coalition government (as in Germany) and not all goals can be achieved immediately or fully. Many of the major challenges we face simply cannot be resolved within a single legislative period. This makes long-term orientation all the more important. In this way, new trust can be built with citizens, who too often experience politics as short-sighted and tactical.
A clear vision for the future would also make it easier to define the party’s identity in election campaigns, as it would be communicated permanently – not just two months before an election. The party could then campaign not just on individual policy measures, but on a compelling, coherent narrative for the future. This would lead to a stronger form of “democratic polarisation,” as Jürgen Habermas has called for. A contest between different visions of society offered by democratic parties is far preferable to a situation in which populist forces are left alone to offer fundamental ideas for change (almost exclusively rooted in a wrong memory of a “glorious” past).
The German SPD’s crisis is deep – but not insurmountable. However, overcoming it requires the courage to return to the party’s old strength: the ability to formulate a convincing and hopeful narrative for a better future and to inspire people to rally behind it. Only with a compelling vision that credibly sets its sights on a good society for the 21st century can the SPD regain strength and effectively counter the advance of populism. The decision to renew the SPD’s fundamental programme is the right starting point. Over the next two years, the task is to develop the vision described above. If this work succeeds, the SPD can not only renew itself, but once again become a political force that provides direction for society and rebuilds trust.
The German version of this article was first published by Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung.
Henning Meyer is the CEO and Editor-in-Chief of Social Europe, Honorary Professor of Public Policy and Business at the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, and Research Associate at the Centre for Business Research at Cambridge University. He previously served as Chief of Staff and Director General for Policy at a German state Ministry of Finance and Science and was the first Fellow of the German Federal Ministry of Finance.