The EU faces mounting pressure to address economic, security, and climate challenges, but the rise of radical right parties threatens to derail the reforms needed to secure Europe’s future.
In the months ahead, European Union leaders face critical decisions about how to address Europe’s profound economic, fiscal, industrial, and security challenges. A popular saying in Brussels, attributed to Jean Monnet, one of the Union’s founding fathers, is that “Europe is forged in crisis.” However, the rise of radical right parties at both the European and member state levels over recent years could significantly complicate the EU’s ability to implement necessary reforms.
Pressure for EU reform is mounting. With war raging in Ukraine and Gaza, the relationship between China and the US cooling, and a potential trade war on the horizon, the EU needs to tackle its lack of competitiveness. Securing economic growth might not be sustainable without closer fiscal integration and a stronger single market, and deeper defence cooperation is needed to meet the growing geopolitical challenges. What is more, in order to future-proof itself, the EU needs to harness new technologies to generate prosperity for the next generation, while at the same time fostering a green transition to deal with the increasing fallout of climate change. Many of these challenges require cross-border cooperation, but exactly at this time, political parties critical of further integrative steps are topping the polls in Europe.
Radical right parties such as the National Rally in France, Fidesz in Hungary, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and the Alternative for Germany have emerged as some of the most Eurosceptic political forces in Europe. These parties have shifted from advocating for exiting the EU—a stance known as exit Euroscepticism—to promoting reform Euroscepticism, which aims to transform the EU into a looser alliance of sovereign states. At first glance, this shift might seem to signal a willingness to engage in EU politics, but a closer examination reveals it could make meaningful reform even harder to achieve.
For much of the postwar period, European integration advanced with minimal concern for public opinion or domestic politics. The European public was largely indifferent to the EU, while political elites across the spectrum broadly supported deeper integration. This dynamic began to change in 2005, when proposed constitutional treaties were rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands. A majority of French and Dutch voters said ‘Non’ and ‘Nee,’ signalling a growing popular demand for Euroscepticism. Since then, Europe has witnessed the rise of parties critiquing the EU and an increasing politicization of European issues in both national and European elections.
The most vocal dissent has come from radical right parties, which initially championed exit Euroscepticism by advocating for their countries to leave the EU. Their fierce opposition to the European project also influenced mainstream parties, making compromises during crises like the Eurozone and refugee crises often insufficient and delayed. The Brexit vote in 2016 proved to be a turning point. For Eurosceptic parties across Europe, Brexit served as a test case. Britain’s decision to leave the EU became a benchmark for evaluating the feasibility and consequences of exiting. However, the political turmoil surrounding Brexit, including the collapse of Boris Johnson’s government, led to increased support for EU membership among citizens in the remaining 27 member states. This shift encouraged radical right parties to abandon calls for exit and instead focus on reforming the EU from within.
Another pivotal moment came in 2017, a year of major elections in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Radical right parties performed worse than expected, particularly Marine Le Pen in France, who was decisively defeated in the second round of the presidential election. During a televised debate, Emmanuel Macron dismantled Le Pen’s plans for a Euro exit, leaving her unable to convincingly defend her position. Macron’s victory underscored the challenges of advocating for exit Euroscepticism.
In response to Brexit and electoral setbacks, radical right politicians who had previously supported Frexit, Nexit, or Italexit shifted their focus to reform scepticism. While this change might seem like a silver lining for the EU, it warrants caution. Adopting a position of reforming the EU from within could prove even more challenging for the Union’s functionality. Radical right parties have gained significant institutional power in the EU, including representation in the European Parliament, where the current assembly is the most right-leaning in its history. Some hold influential roles, such as vice presidencies in the European Commission, and many now sit in the Council as part of government coalitions at the national level. The question remains: how will these parties wield their influence?
Thus far, two approaches to reforming Euroscepticism have emerged: conflict and cooperation. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán exemplifies the conflict approach, supporting EU initiatives only when they serve his financial interests and framing the EU as a scapegoat for domestic political gain. Conversely, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni represents the cooperation approach, leveraging her role in brokering EU solutions to bolster her image as a power broker and underscore Italy’s significance on the European stage.
The return of Donald Trump to the US Presidency could influence which of these approaches prevails. According to conventional Monnet thinking, Trump’s transactional approach might pressure European countries to cooperate and reform, as the economic and security consequences of inaction could alienate voters. However, Trump’s “America First” doctrine could also shift the calculus for radical right parties. Their move from exit to reform Euroscepticism was largely strategic, and Trump’s rhetoric might rekindle a nationalist, “country-first” ideology. Many radical right supporters admired Trump’s first term, and adopting a similarly transactional stance could resonate with their domestic base, even if cooperation might yield better results.
If radical right parties in government are drawn toward transactional “my country first” policies, the scope for achieving common European positions will narrow further. Historically, EU negotiations have been fraught with commitment problems and lowest-common-denominator solutions. With the rise of the radical right, the path to reform that the European continent so desperately needs, appears increasingly constrained.
This article is part of the Project “EU Forward” Social Europe runs in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Catherine de Vries holds the Generali Endowed Chair in European Policies and is a Professor of Political Science at Bocconi University. She also serves as President of the Institute of European Policy Making at Bocconi University and is co-chair Bocconi’s International Advisory Council.