Populists Are Taking Over—Here’s Why Democracy Is Failing

Dissatisfied voters and outdated systems fuel populism’s rise. Can bold reforms restore trust in liberal democracy? A conversation with Mark Blyth.

Henning Meyer: Mark Blyth, thank you very much for joining me today. We’re here to discuss the global ramifications of the second Trump presidency, particularly for the European Union, in the political and economic context we find ourselves in—or will find ourselves in shortly. Let’s begin with Trump’s “America First” agenda. How do you see this playing out in terms of trade policy, and what disruptions might this create for the EU? More importantly, how should the EU respond to mitigate these risks?

Mark Blyth: Thanks, Henning. Well, the EU has had four years to prepare for something like this—or at least to devise contingency plans. But here’s the thing: many seemed to assume that the election of Trump in 2016 was an aberration. That assumption was a mistake. Trumpism isn’t a fluke; it’s the new normal.

You see this reflected in Europe too. In the UK, Reform, led by Brexit’s architect, is gaining momentum. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally could very well emerge as the leading party. Austria’s politics are shifting, and even Germany’s AfD, while geographically limited, highlights broader trends. Yet, there’s a persistent denialism in Europe—a belief that populism is a passing phase. That complacency has left the EU ill-prepared for what might come next.

The challenge is compounded by the sheer unpredictability of Trump’s presidency. His administration is filled with individuals who, frankly, seem intent on antagonising Europe. And then there’s Trump himself—a wildcard. It’s not beyond imagination that he could declare a national emergency on dubious grounds or take drastic steps we can’t yet anticipate.

Henning Meyer: That unpredictability is unsettling. It seems like even within the US, there’s little clarity on what Trump’s priorities will be on day one.

Mark Blyth: Exactly. No one knows. The first few days could bring a blizzard of executive orders, creating chaos that takes weeks or months to untangle. In the worst-case scenario, we could see him undermining institutions like NATO or taking unilateral steps to end the Ukraine war. How that would play out—especially without NATO—is anyone’s guess.

Trade is another area to watch. Previously, Trump’s ire was directed at German car exports. But with Europe’s automotive sector now under pressure from Chinese competition and the shift to electric vehicles, that’s less of a concern. Tariffs, however? Those could target anyone for any reason. We’re in uncharted waters here.

Henning Meyer: And what about Trump’s domestic coalition? It seems fragile, especially given tensions between the MAGA movement and tech billionaires—two factions that helped propel him back into office. Could those divisions derail his agenda?

Mark Blyth: That’s an interesting dynamic. Does Trump really need a stable coalition? He’s proven adept at dodging accountability and playing to his base. As far as he’s concerned, his re-election is a mandate, and he’s been transparent about his goals: mass deportations and tariffs.

If we try to make sense of these policies, there’s a theoretical framework that fits. Take the argument from Michael Pettis and Matthew Klein in their book Trade Wars Are Class Wars. They argue that globalisation disproportionately benefits large corporations while eroding workers’ livelihoods. For Trump’s team, the US as a structural importer—relying on goods from East Asia, Germany, and Europe—represents a strategic weakness. Rebalancing the economy by reducing imports, encouraging domestic production, and tightening labour markets through immigration restrictions could, in theory, create a more self-reliant US.

But here’s the problem: while these ideas have been floated, there’s no coherent strategy behind them. It’s all improvisation, which makes it even harder to predict outcomes.

Henning Meyer: Turning to the EU, what should its leaders be doing to prepare? Ursula von der Leyen’s second Commission has just started its term, and the stakes couldn’t be higher.

Mark Blyth: The EU needs to think strategically. It can’t isolate itself from the US, but it must prepare for a more confrontational transatlantic relationship. That means investing in resilience—whether in defence, energy, or trade. Strengthening ties with other global partners, particularly in Asia, could also help diversify Europe’s economic dependencies.

Above all, the EU must overcome its internal divisions. Trump’s unpredictability will test Europe’s unity. If member states can’t present a cohesive front, they’ll be vulnerable to divide-and-conquer tactics. The EU should be thinking not just about mitigating risks but also about asserting itself as a geopolitical actor in its own right.

Henning Meyer: And in terms of timing, when do you think we’ll have a clearer picture of what this presidency will mean for the EU and the world?

Mark Blyth: I expect the first week of the new adminstration to bring a deluge of executive orders. By the end of January, we’ll have a better sense of Trump’s priorities and how far he’s willing to go. But the real test will come in the months that follow, as the EU assesses whether it can adapt and respond effectively—or whether it’ll be left scrambling, as it was in 2016.

Henning Meyer: What do you think the EU should do to prepare strategically and protect its interests?

Mark Blyth: The first thing would be to double the EU’s budget—though, of course, that would be very unpopular. However, the EU needs fiscal room to manoeuvre, to incentivise certain behaviours, and to ensure unity. For example, Italy and Hungary must be prevented from making side deals. There has to be a united position on issues like sanctions. If sanctions are in place, it is essential to evaluate their purpose and what they aim to achieve. If they are jeopardising Europe’s car industry, for instance, reciprocal measures against the U.S. might be considered—though finding effective targets is tricky.

The EU is now heavily reliant on American LNG imports due to the Ukraine crisis, giving the U.S. leverage. The focus should be on identifying strategic sectors that are critical for Europe’s long-term interests. Can Europe survive potential tariffs? Would relocating more car production to the US actually be harmful, or could it create opportunities? Perhaps this is an opportunity for Europe to rebalance its own economy and reduce overreliance on exports.

Henning Meyer: You mentioned the EU’s internal divisions earlier. With leaders like Orbán in Hungary and Meloni in Italy, it is hard to see how the EU can unify. How does this affect the broader push for security and defence integration?

Mark Blyth: A stronger focus on security and defence is both necessary and overdue. However, the challenge lies in defining what Europe is fortifying against. Is it solely Russian revanchism? Fair enough. But much of this also ties into concerns regarding China. Concurrently, Europe does not want to be coerced by the US into adopting an overly hawkish stance toward China. This leaves the EU in a precarious position, building internal strength while navigating increasingly fractious external relations. Europe finds itself negotiating between a rock and a hard place.

Henning Meyer: Many people mistakenly believed that 2016 was an aberration. But this is constitutionally Trump’s second and final term. What happens to MAGA beyond Trump?

Mark Blyth: MAGA isn’t just about Trump; it is part of a broader collapse of trust in centre parties and traditional institutions. Decades of economic mismanagement, from the financial crisis to austerity policies, have eroded faith in the system. Immigration, for example, has been a massive concern for European populations. For years, policy elites dismissed these concerns, labelling anyone who raised them as racist. That arrogance only fuelled the backlash from the right.

This discontent isn’t limited to the US either; it’s global. I recently visited my hometown of Dundee, Scotland. In the 1980s, it was struggling, but there was still a sense of prosperity on main street. Today, a third of the stores downtown are boarded up. People in places like this feel abandoned. Political leaders show up every four years with promises, but their realities remain unchanged. This plight—what in the NHS calls “shit life syndrome”—drives support for populist figures like Nigel Farage, who acknowledge these frustrations, even if their solutions are flawed.

Henning Meyer: Amid all these challenges, is there any reason to be hopeful?

Mark Blyth: It’s hard to find optimism right now. But here’s the long-term view: America is about to make a big mistake by doubling down on carbon. Climate change is a problem of physics, not politics. Europe, despite some setbacks, is moving toward a green transition. Countries like Denmark and Norway are showing that you can build green economies even while relying on carbon in the short term. China, too, is serious about dominating green technology.

America’s current path may bring short-term gains, but in the long term, the rest of the world will move in a different direction. Europe has an opportunity here. If it can embrace rebalancing—consuming more, investing in infrastructure, and becoming less dependent on exports—it could create a more sustainable economic model. The next decade will be rough, but if we want to survive as a species, this is the direction we must take.

Henning Meyer: Mark, thank you again for joining me to discuss these critical issues. This conversation certainly calls for a follow-up in the near future.

This article is part of the Project “EU Forward” Social Europe runs in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.