With 2024’s elections stoking deep divides, societies worldwide are asking if we can still bridge our differences—or if polarisation has become the new norm.
When examining the ideological divisions in Europe, general attitudes towards specific policy directions tend to converge towards the centre. While the diversity of opinions is greater in the United States, a common ground still exists among citizens concerning practical solutions to some acute and divisive issues. Nevertheless, polarisation is on the rise in our societies. This paradox is exacerbated by partisan conflicts aimed at electoral gain. Affective polarisation acts as a powerful tool for voter mobilisation and cultivates a fertile ground for political activism. However, this emotional divide leads to increasing distances, biases, and even political violence against opponents. Partisan polarisation generates a vicious cycle of emotional warfare, stifling constructive policy debates. Most critically, it benefits populist and fringe parties. During a presidential debate, Kamala Harris remarked that it is time to “turn the page” and introduce a new, unifying quality to political competition. Is there a way out of this impasse, or has the opportunity already passed us by.
So close, yet so far
The year 2024 is set to be a super election year. In 72 countries worldwide, 3.7 billion voters are eligible to cast their ballots. We have already conducted European elections in 27 member states and are still preparing for the federal and presidential elections in the United States. Elections are often referred to as a festival of democracy, yet in the last decade, they have increasingly become a celebration of differences and divisions.
Research indicates that Europeans agree on many issues and can find common ground, either for or against contentious policy topics. Regarding generational conflict, there is no evidence that young and older generations in Europe are becoming more ideologically divergent. While there are differences in how younger people perceive specific social issues compared to older cohorts, overall, majorities support similar policies. The existing age divides may be more accurately described as cohort effects or influenced by particular events, rather than a comprehensive recalibration of ideological positions. Furthermore, gaps between the young and old have remained relatively constant over time. In addition, Europeans have adopted a more liberal stance on certain cultural issues, including women’s rights, gay rights, and diversity.
The situation in the United States presents a different picture. Age is a significant factor influencing ideological orientation. Younger people tend to be more liberal, while seniors, on average, are disproportionately more conservative. Interestingly, however, previous generations—the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, and Generation X—exhibit greater divisions on political issues compared to Millennials and Generation Z. Both Democrats and Republicans can find common ground on certain policies, such as restricting access to assault-style weapons; however, they differ in their perceptions of the importance and urgency of specific issues. Some Republicans are gradually adopting more progressive views on certain matters, such as LGBTQ rights, but the leftward shift of the Democratic Party has maintained a considerable gap. Additionally, political beliefs typically associated with Republicans or Democrats are not always consistent: individuals can hold economically progressive views while being culturally conservative, a phenomenon that is not uncommon in European contexts.
Polarisation as a Weapon of Mass Destruction
Paradoxically, polarisation is on the rise in both Europe and the United States. Data from V-Dem shows that while there are differing opinions on the general trajectory of societal development in these regions, political polarisation—in terms of how political differences affect social relationships beyond mere political discussions—is increasing even more sharply. Political polarisation has also emerged as a powerful yet dangerous tool in campaigning. This trend is associated with a shift in focus within political campaigns.
Spatial polarisation refers to placing political preferences along various policy dimensions. Political parties refine their profiles by diversifying their platforms, offering either centrist or more extreme positions. Campaigns attract voters through manifestos that advocate for specific policies. In contrast, affective polarisation relies on emotions, which are crucial drivers of political behaviour. This approach centres on categorical thinking, identity and belonging, appealing to fundamental instincts. A successful campaign effectively employs both strategies. Unfortunately, parties on both sides of the political spectrum increasingly resort to creating a sense of ‘false polarisation‘, which boosts voter turnout but continuously divides our societies into hostile factions.
I have observed this phenomenon escalating dangerously in the countries where I have lived. In Germany, political polarisation is relatively low and asymmetric; the political mainstream, comprising the centre-left and centre-right, stands in contrast to the far right. Voters from the CDU, CSU, SPD, Green, and FDP parties generally hold neutral to positive sentiments towards one another, with the notable exception of a strongly negative view of the AfD.
Conversely, Poland’s political landscape has been dominated for more than a decade by two opposing camps: the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) and the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO). Particularly during the time Law and Justice was in power, the negative emotions expressed by supporters of the opposition were stronger towards PiS than vice versa. But during those eight years, Law and Justice was constantly excluding the opposition from the national community, calling them „traitors“ and „pure evil“.
In the United States, pernicious polarisation prevails, with both Republicans and Democrats viewing members of the opposing party as closed-minded, dishonest, immoral, and unintelligent. Intense political competition drives parties across the left, right, and centre to emphasise differences rather than commonalities, resulting in increased emotional messaging. Consequently, we find ourselves in separate media bubbles characterised by partisan bias and fragmented societies.
Voters are fatigued; can politics deliver?
Political polarisation has emerged as a powerful tool for mobilising voters and encouraging political engagement. Recent voter turnout figures are historically high: 66.8 per cent in the United States in 2020, 74.38 per cent in Poland in 2023, and over 70 per cent in the regional elections of Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg in Germany in 2024. While political polarisation undoubtedly drives voter turnout, it also carries side effects, including widening social distances, partisan bias, and even incidents of politically motivated violence.
Policy issues quickly escalate into highly emotional debates. In the lead-up to elections, abortion rights are frequently challenged—or promised; climate change is questioned, and climate action is alarmingly politicised; migration is framed solely in negative terms, focusing on national security, labour market challenges, and cultural conflicts. All three countries have also witnessed incidents of political violence, including attacks on government buildings in Berlin and Washington DC, as well as assaults on individual politicians, such as the attempted assassinations of Donald Trump during his campaign trail and the earlier tragic deaths of CDU politician Walter Lübcke and the mayor of Gdańsk, Paweł Adamowicz.
Meanwhile, Americans are weary of ongoing polarisation, perceiving politics as “divisive” and “corrupt.” Approximately 74 per cent of Germans view societal division as potentially threatening to democracy. In Poland, nearly 80 per cent of the public believes the country is more divided than united, with 57 per cent avoiding political discussions to prevent arguments among family and friends.
In Germany, politicians from all mainstream parties are contemplating a “firewall” to isolate the far-right AfD. While this approach may be morally justifiable, applying cancel culture only reinforces the victim-playing strategy of the party and does not appear to assist in reclaiming supporters for the political centre. During the 2023 parliamentary campaign, Donald Tusk promised to end “the Polish-Polish war.” To date, he has not achieved this goal. In the U.S. presidential campaign, Kamala Harris is advocating for “turning the page”: uniting the country and seeking common ground. This will be challenging after years of politics conducted on a knife’s edge. There is a pressing need for a new quality in politics that goes beyond electoral arithmetic and considers the long-term effects of strong language and imagery in election campaigns. Perhaps the Democrats will be the first to demonstrate how it can be done.
Dr Maria Skóra is a researcher and political analyst in Berlin. At the Institut für Europäische Politik, she analysing rule-of-law developments in the European Union. She is also a policy fellow at the think-tank Das Progressive Zentrum, hosting the annual Progressive Governance Summit.