European elections: political squalls ahead

The shift in the centre of gravity of the European Parliament could make for a fractious next term.

As the European Union went to the polls last weekend, a banner headline in the digital newspaper Politico declared: ‘Europe’s Trump moment has arrived.’ It cited a surge in support for nationalist-populist parties of the radical right, which seemed set to emerge as a major force in the directly-elected European Parliament.

A week on, the debate still rages about whether such an apocalyptic view was justified. While the disparate forces of the far right have gained ground in a string of member states, above all in France and Germany, it was no landslide.

Protest vote

European elections are a hybrid affair, both national and European, in cause and in effect. Voters still vote nationally—and the parties campaign that way. But the formal purpose is to elect a European parliament which still seems remote and irrelevant to most participants, so they treat the poll as a perfect opportunity to cast a protest vote.

That is precisely what happened in France, where Marine Le Pen’s nationalist and deeply Eurosceptic Rassemblement National won more than a third of the votes—double the score for Emmanuel Macron’s liberal Renaissance alliance. The president’s subsequent decision to dissolve the National Assembly and call a snap election is an extraordinary gamble. It could yet cause a ‘Trump moment’ in France, if the RN were to win a majority next month, or emerge as the largest party and dominate a new government. That prospect has caused mayhem on the financial markets and consternation in Brussels.

In Germany, the result was humiliating for the chancellor, Olaf Scholz, but less dramatic. The far-right Alternative für Deutschland came second with 16 per cent—more than any of the parties in the ruling coalition—and came top of the poll in the former Communist east of the country, exposing the deep division that still exists more than 30 years after unification. Scholz looks a lame duck.

Clear winner

At the European level, however, the clear winner was not the far right but the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP). It remains the largest group in the parliament, as it has been since 1999, with 190 seats out of 720. The biggest losers were the liberal Renew Europe group (Macron’s allies) and the Greens. The centre-left Socialists and Democrats lost just three seats overall (with 136), thanks to good results in Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark. But the ‘progressive majority’ that used to exist, uniting social democrats, liberals, Greens and the far left, has evaporated.

In the old parliament, the liberals were the swing party of power—capable of delivering a majority to the right on economic policy and to the left on justice and social affairs. Now it is the EPP whose support will be necessary for any parliamentary majority at all. Overall, the parliament is a significantly more conservative place. The new assembly, guardian of the EU budget, will most likely be tougher on immigration controls, weaker on environmental policies and less outspoken on justice and human rights.

Even if the parliamentary arithmetic suggests no fundamental  change, the mood will be very different. The parties of the far right are fractious, rowdy and disruptive. The first question is whether they can forge a new super-group, entitling them to more jobs and influence. If they could, with roughly 160 members, they would be second only to the EPP, capable of dictating much of the agenda.

That however seems very unlikely. They are primarily nationalists, instinctively averse to the idea of common European positions—united in their hostility to immigration but not much else. The group of European Conservatives and Reformists, once home to the British Conservatives before ‘Brexit’—and now where the Polish Law and Justice party sits with Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy—is very hostile to Russia and pro-NATO. The Identity and Democracy group, home to Le Pen’s RN, Italy’s Lega and the Dutch and Austrian ‘freedom’ parties, is supportive of Vladimir Putin. The AfD has been expelled, after Le Pen distanced herself, but might come back under new leadership. Hungary’s Fidesz is also looking for a new home.

Real dilemma

There is a real dilemma for the EPP, however. Does it try to preserve the ‘grand coalition’ of centre-right and centre-left pro-Europeans, with the social democrats and liberals, or does it risk alienating its old allies by doing deals with the most ‘acceptable’ members of the far right—such as Meloni, the Italian prime minister? According to EPP insiders, any allies would have to be, at a minimum, ‘pro-European, pro-Ukraine and pro-rule of law’. So Meloni would be potentially acceptable but not the ID.

The immediate test will come very soon. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, is seeking a new five-year term. As Spitzenkandidat (lead candidate) for the EPP that should be a shoo-in. ‘We won the elections,’ as she says. ‘We are the anchor of stability.’

She needs to be proposed by a qualified majority of EU leaders in the European Council and confirmed by a majority (361 votes) in the parliament. It is a secret ballot and she cannot rely on all 401 MEPs in the grand coalition to support her. Last time she just scraped through. The French Republicains, and Ireland’s Fianna Fáil, have already said they will not back her, so she is looking for other allies.

Von der Leyen could do a deal with Meloni but might then lose the votes of social democrats and liberals—they have already denounced any such plan. She could seek the backing of the Greens but they are not popular with her own EPP. Her best answer is to do no formal deals and trust that they have no alternative.

There is also a dilemma for the centre-left. It is in danger of playing eternal second-fiddle to the EPP in the centrist coalition. Does it maintain a red line against any deal involving any member of the far right, as it says? Does it march off into constant opposition or compromise issue-by-issue? The whole history of the European Parliament is one of compromise—which is what makes it so difficult to deal with the ideologues of the far right (and far left).

Even if the old coalition holds for the re-election of von der Leyen, pressure will build within the EPP for pragmatic deals of convenience with the far right. Several centre-right parties are already in government at home with far-right partners. So it is going to become more difficult for both the major groups to maintain a solid cordon sanitaire in the parliament. Getting legislation through will be complicated. Much will depend on the tensions within the EPP.

Huge unknown

None of that amounts to a ‘Trump moment’ in the EU, quite yet. But the huge unknown precipitated by the European election is the outcome of Macron’s gamble in France. If an RN-led French government were to emerge, all bets would be off.

The party no longer wants to leave the EU (thanks to the lesson of Brexit) or the euro, but it does want to re-erect national borders to immigration and reverse a bundle of EU regulations. Macron’s authority, as one of the most fervent supporters of the EU, is already sorely undermined. So is that of Scholz—which leaves the Franco-German tandem very lame.

Those who have argued over the years that European elections don’t matter very much should think again. They can have dramatic, if unintended, consequences.