The emotional underpinnings of populism

This following conversation is based on a Social Europe podcast episode and is edited for length and clarity.

Henning Meyer: Peter Hall, thank you so much for joining me again on the Social Europe podcast. It’s hard to believe it’s been seven years since we last discussed the rise of populism in Western democracies. Back then, we talked about the economic and cultural drivers behind populism. In the meantime, you’ve published research on perceptions of fairness and economic uncertainty and how these have contributed to the rise of populism. Could you pick up from where we left off and share your new insights on the subject?

Peter A. Hall: Yes, of course. This is a moving and growing target. I’ve been working on this with Sung In Kim at Harvard, and we’ve been looking at European countries, trying to move beyond the standard interpretations. The traditional view is that economic hardship—like the loss of manufacturing jobs due to global shocks—has driven support for right-wing populist parties. Others, like Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, suggest it’s a cultural backlash against post-material values. Both of these perspectives have merit, but they don’t fully address the issue of fairness.

Politics is often about who gets what, when and how, but it also involves moral visions. Social democratic parties, for example, have historically focused on social justice, while the right justifies tax cuts and deregulation as fair rewards for individual effort. However, most analyses of populism don’t account for how much people’s sense of fairness—or lack thereof—drives their support for populist parties. Our research shows that people on both the radical left and right may support these movements because they believe their situation or society is fundamentally unfair.

A second point we’ve explored is that people aren’t just concerned with their current circumstances but are also deeply worried about future uncertainty—whether society or their own lives will improve or worsen in the coming years. Even those who have decent jobs may fear that their work is at risk of being automated or replaced by AI, and this uncertainty can lead them to support radical right parties. So, fairness and uncertainty are key to understanding why populism is rising.

Henning Meyer: This sense of future uncertainty seems to be growing. Technological change is accelerating, and more groups are affected. It used to be lorry drivers and self-driving cars, but now, with generative AI, even creative jobs are at risk. The breadth and speed of these changes seem to fuel uncertainty. Mainstream political parties don’t seem to have convincing answers for how to shape the future, which leads to a sense of lost control—something we saw with events like Brexit and migration, too. Do you see a connection between this uncertainty, the feeling of lost control, and the inability of mainstream parties to offer a clear vision?

Peter A. Hall: Absolutely. The truth is, we face an incredibly uncertain world. Who knows, maybe seven years from now, it’ll be an avatar interviewing me instead of you, Henning! This uncertainty is worrying people. What’s interesting is why this uncertainty leads to support for right-wing populist parties rather than center or left-wing parties.

Social psychology offers some answers. Research shows that when people feel uncertain, they become more attuned to issues of unfairness. There’s a mutually reinforcing relationship between economic uncertainty and the perception that their situation is unfair. At the same time, uncertainty makes people more defensive of their in-group, which often leads to hostility toward out-groups—like immigrants. Immigrants frequently become targets of right-wing populist rhetoric. So, the link between uncertainty and support for the populist right is a key causal chain.

For example, I have a friend at Northwestern University who conducted experiments where he showed people images of robots and then asked them about their views on immigrants. People who saw the robots were more hostile toward immigrants. It seems strange at first, but it reveals a deeper connection: when people feel the world is out of control, they become defensive and focus on perceived threats, like immigration.

Henning Meyer: The immigration issue is particularly complex. In Europe, people often oppose refugees while simultaneously acknowledging that labor shortages require more immigration. So, the context in which the immigration debate happens seems crucial. Does this align with your findings?

Peter A. Hall: Yes, it does. There’s a paradox in Western societies: we need immigration to maintain prosperity, and some argue that the American economy has fared relatively well recently due to immigration. But people’s thinking about immigration isn’t driven by rational economic logic. It’s more emotional. They see immigration not as a solution to economic problems but as a threat to their identity and culture. This emotional response, which populist politicians exploit, is crucial in understanding the current political landscape.

Henning Meyer: Many observers here in Europe have noted that policy solutions alone won’t solve the populist challenge. Recent elections, particularly in Germany, have shown that political strategies seem to be running out of steam. Popular politicians are barely winning. It feels like we’re reaching the limits of what politics can deliver in terms of defence. This leaves us with an underlying cultural struggle driven by uncertainty about the future. Could you expand on your research into how support for right-wing and left-wing populism differs?

Peter A. Hall: Sure. Sung In and I studied 13 European countries, distinguishing between personal unfairness—how people feel about their own situation—and social unfairness—how they feel about society’s fairness overall. Those who perceive high social unfairness tend to support the radical left or centre-left. Young people, the unemployed, and those with lower incomes are more likely to support the radical left. In contrast, people who feel their personal situation is unfair are more likely to support the populist right and oppose immigration.

The stark difference we found is that personal unfairness drives support for the populist right, while social unfairness leads people to the left. This contrast is one of the key insights from our research, which we published in Comparative Political Studies.

Henning Meyer: There’s been a worrying trend of young voters moving toward the far right in recent elections, both in Germany and Austria. Is this linked to the feeling of personal unfairness among the youth?

Peter A. Hall: Our research doesn’t specifically answer this question, but there are some plausible explanations. Older voters may have some residual loyalty to traditional parties, while young people don’t have that same connection. Another factor could be the economic situation of young people. In countries with high youth unemployment, like France and parts of southern Europe, young people face precarious job prospects. This might explain why they’re drawn to the populist right. However, I think more research is needed to fully understand this trend.

Henning Meyer: When we put all these pieces together—economic and cultural factors, uncertainty, and personal perceptions of unfairness—what’s your overall assessment of the health of Western democracies?

Peter A. Hall: It could be better. In Eastern Europe, democracy is under serious threat, with countries like Hungary and (previously) Poland eroding democratic institutions. In Western Europe, I’m somewhat more optimistic. Populist right parties have been part of coalition governments without necessarily undermining democracy, though they do pose threats to immigrant communities and social cohesion.

What concerns me most is the erosion of social norms that kept political discourse within certain bounds. The American case, for instance, shows how inflammatory rhetoric can have lasting effects. Even if populist politicians don’t win office, the divisions they create can leave deep social scars.

Henning Meyer: Against this difficult backdrop, what can mainstream parties—Christian Democrats, Social Democrats—do to change course?

One major issue is the perceived failure of public administration to deliver on big challenges. People are losing trust in government. Governments must become more capable of addressing people’s grievances and delivering tangible results. For instance, the government pledged to build 400,000 flats per year in Germany but has fallen far short of this target. Housing is a key factor in reducing uncertainty, yet the government has not delivered on this promise.

Beyond policy, though, mainstream parties must offer a broader political vision that addresses people’s fears about the future. Without that, policy solutions alone will not be enough to regain trust.

Peter A. Hall: You’re right. It’s easier said than done. While generous social benefits are important, people also want decent jobs. Governments can help make existing jobs better by focusing on living wage laws and other regulations that improve working conditions. This may not solve all the problems, but it can help reduce some of the uncertainty people feel.

Henning Meyer: During the last election, Olaf Scholz tapped into this sentiment, talking about “respect” for the workers who keep society running. It was part of his success then.

Peter, thank you so much for sharing your insights. Hopefully, in seven years, we’ll discuss how all of this has been resolved!

Peter A. Hall: It’s been a pleasure, Henning. Thanks for having me.

Listen to or watch the podcast episode here: https://podcast.socialeurope.eu/episode/the-emotional-underpinnings-of-populism