Once optimistic, key European leaders who backed Donald Trump now face stinging tariffs and a new, uncompromising Washington.
The spectre of a second Trump presidency has loomed large in Europe over the past three months. Many leaders, burnt by the first incarnation, were pessimistic about Donald Trump’s return to the White House and what it would mean for multilateral institutions, such as NATO, and the fate of Ukraine. A select number, however, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, were more optimistic. These figures – Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serb leader, Milorad Dodik – seemed advantaged by their relationship with, and ideological affinity to, the new president. They predicted a “golden era” of bilateral relations and spoke openly about how a Trump-led White House would help make their country “great again”.
Little was said then about potential roadblocks. Mr Orbán, Mr Vučić, Mr Dodik and others assumed, despite Mr Trump’s repeated campaign promises regarding tariffs and trade, that their countries would be exempted or afforded preferential treatment on the basis of their support. And yet, here they stand, the victims of a new, business-like and imperial approach from Washington, in which big countries with influence are taken seriously, while others are viewed as having “no cards” to play.
On 2 April, a date some had sarcastically dubbed “Liberation Day”, there was no mercy for Mr Trump’s allies. Serbia was hit with a whopping 37 percent tariff rate on its exports, the largest in the region; Bosnia and Herzegovina was slapped with a 35 percent levy; and Hungary, whose leader is widely considered a political bedfellow of the new president, faces a potential 20 percent charge on exports as a consequence of its membership of the EU and its economic relations with China and Russia.
It has been a chastening period for these leaders and their citizens alike, given Washington’s historic interest in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It has also exposed the dynamics of a relationship that Mr Orbán, Mr Vučić and Mr Dodik had hoped would work in their favour.
This was evident when the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, swiftly and unequivocally condemned Milorad Dodik’s signing of separatist laws that challenged Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional order. Mr Rubio also warned local and regional actors – including Hungary and Croatia – against trying to undermine the Dayton Peace Accords.
Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia, hopeful of a pro-Belgrade shift under the new administration on the issue of Kosovo, as well as the lifting of sanctions on the Serbian oil company, NIS, has also been left wanting. That Richard Grenell, the White House’s envoy for special missions and a staunch supporter of Mr Vučić, has failed to publicly back him against a backdrop of country-wide protests against the Serbian president, reveals much about how the new administration in Washington is treating a number of its cheerleaders.
In the case of Hungary, whose prime minister and government championed Mr Trump’s return, the first 100 days of the 47th US President’s term have been especially humbling. Mr Orbán had predicted a “fantastic, great golden age” in Hungarian-American relations, courtesy of his relationship with the president, and spoke of a positive impact for “Hungarian wallets”. It is doubtful that he foresaw stinging tariffs, the maintenance of US sanctions against members of his government – including his cabinet chief, Antal Rogán, who oversees the country’s secret services – and public denouncements by Republicans concerning Hungary’s economic policy vis-à-vis China and Russia.
All three leaders continue to hope that the Trump administration’s transactional approach is temporary and that there will be an eventual upswing in bilateral relations. This likely explains their continued emulation of US policy, and their respective scolding of civil society organisations and NGOs that have benefited from USAID grants, in a nod to the US Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). Similarly, under the guise of streamlining government spending, defending sovereignty and fighting “woke” forces, each has set up initiatives that both signal ideological proximity to their ally across the Atlantic and aim to silence critics of the US president within their own territories.
The problem, however, is that difficult, and potentially embarrassing, hurdles are coming down the track. Hungarian defence spending, and the country’s contributions to NATO which fall below average, continue to be an issue – and are something the US President is likely to point out in the run-up to June’s annual summit of members.
China and Russia’s growing presence in both Hungary and Serbia is also likely to prove a sticking point for the White House. Dependencies on Russian energy will continue to attract criticism, while US Government officials have already made clear to both nations that China poses a “strategic challenge” – a point that was re-emphasised by the president’s eldest son, Donald Trump Jr, on recent visits to Budapest and Belgrade. These soft calls to decouple from powers in the East, and to prioritise US economic engagement, will almost certainly morph into something more forceful if there is no shift in behaviour.
The reality is that the aggressive unilateralism which has so far defined Mr Trump’s second term is exposing the limits of ideological alignment. While many in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans remain sympathetic to the US, and continue to view their relationship with Washington in a positive light, the current dynamics are sowing doubts. Should this continue to play out, in the longer term, citizens are likely to question the benefit of championing the US president’s policies. They may even conclude that, between a burgeoning autocrat in Washington and creeping autocracies in the East, their future prosperity and freedom lie with a source Mr Orbán, Mr Vučić and Mr Dodik have persistently rallied against: the European Union.
Ferenc Németh is a Western Balkans expert and a PhD Candidate at the Corvinus University of Budapest.
Peter Kreko is the executive director of Political Capital, a Budapest-based independent think tank.