Austria’s Far-Right Revival: How the ÖVP’s U-Turn is Paving the Way for Radical Leadership

The Austrian far-right FPÖ’s likely return to government raises concerns about the erosion of liberal democracy—and the centre-right’s complicity in enabling it.

At the start of the year, Austria marked the thirtieth anniversary of its accession to the European Union in 1995. However, this celebration was soon overshadowed by the collapse of coalition negotiations among the People’s Party (ÖVP), the Social Democrats (SPÖ), and the liberal NEOS. The talks fell apart when NEOS withdrew, quickly followed by the ÖVP. Despite a shared goal of blocking far-right leader Herbert Kickl and keeping the Freedom Party (FPÖ) out of government, their common ground proved insufficient.

Shortly after the mainstream parties failed to agree, the president invited FPÖ leader Kickl to form a government. His party achieved its best-ever result in last September’s national election, garnering 29 percent of the vote. Although the ÖVP had previously ruled out forming a coalition with the “Kickl-FPÖ” but not the party itself, they soon reversed course after Kickl was handed the mandate. Members of the ÖVP who had labelled Kickl a “security risk” and vowed not to work under his leadership suddenly went silent on their earlier objections, preparing instead to enter talks with the far right.

Thus, three decades after joining the EU, Austria may soon have its first government led by the far-right, anti-EU FPÖ. The ÖVP, often referred to as Austria’s Europapartei (“Europe Party”), appears willing once again to partner with the far right, despite the FPÖ’s Eurosceptic rhetoric, admiration for Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán, and its affiliation with the far-right, Eurosceptic “Patriots for Europe” faction in the European Parliament. The ÖVP seems ready to turn a blind eye to positions that, in principle, contradict the party’s pro-European values.

While the ÖVP’s sudden shift on Kickl may surprise some, it is consistent with the party’s history of downplaying concerns about the far right. As early as October, citing “political traditions,” party members argued that the “Kickl-FPÖ,” as the election winner, should be given the opportunity to form a government.

There are two plausible explanations for why the ÖVP advocated for Kickl to receive the president’s mandate. First, they may have calculated that the FPÖ would fail to secure a coalition partner, as all other parties categorically refused to work with the far right. This scenario would position the ÖVP to step in and “finish the job,” enhancing its reputation as a reliable party. Alternatively, the ÖVP may have anticipated that the FPÖ, lacking other options, would turn to them for a coalition, providing two strategic advantages: increased leverage in negotiations and the ability to portray itself as a reluctant but dutiful participant, prioritising Austria’s need for stable governance. This approach would also spare the ÖVP from prolonged and likely fruitless negotiations with the SPÖ, given their ideological differences on key issues such as socio-economic policy.

Regardless of the rationale, the ÖVP’s willingness to allow the far right to lead coalition talks appears, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, disingenuous. The party’s supposed commitment to barring Kickl from power was likely never genuine.

The ÖVP’s apparent U-turn on negotiating with Kickl is just one example in a pattern of broken promises. In 2021, several ÖVP ministers announced they would resign if former chancellor Sebastian Kurz left office. Yet, most remained in their positions until the coalition with the Greens ended, and some even served as interim chancellors after Kurz’s departure from politics. Such instances suggest that the ÖVP’s commitments should be viewed with scepticism.

A far-right government now seems highly probable. Even if initial talks between the FPÖ and ÖVP fail, it would likely lead to new elections in which the far right is best positioned to win. Polling at around 35 percent, the FPÖ is significantly ahead of its rivals and reportedly better financed to mount another campaign, according to the Austrian daily Der Standard. This dynamic gives the ÖVP little incentive to undermine negotiations, which would only strengthen the FPÖ’s hand.

Christian Stocker, the new ÖVP chairman, has already signalled the party’s readiness to engage with the far right, outlining conditions such as respect for the rule of law and media freedom, independence from Russia, and a united stance against antisemitism. He also emphasised Austria’s need to remain a “reliable partner” for the EU.

However, these conditions ring hollow given the ÖVP’s track record. During its previous coalition with the FPÖ, the ÖVP repeatedly overlooked far-right transgressions, including a controversial raid on Austria’s intelligence services under then-interior minister Kickl. The government’s collapse following the Ibiza affair—a scandal involving FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache—was the only controversy too large to ignore. Yet Kurz has since expressed regret over the coalition’s premature end, despite the undemocratic behaviour revealed in the scandal. At the regional level, the ÖVP continues to govern with the FPÖ in several coalitions, where challenges to liberal democracy persist, raising doubts about its ability to uphold democratic norms at the federal level.

In the likely event of a far-right-led government, Austria’s democratic future would hinge on the ÖVP. Yet, as a junior coalition partner, the party would be poorly equipped to safeguard liberal democratic principles against a far-right partner that consistently undermines societal norms. The ÖVP’s history of accommodating the FPÖ’s attacks on democracy paints a bleak picture of its resolve.

If Austria’s mainstream right is willing to empower the FPÖ, the task of defending liberal democratic values will likely fall to civil society and the media.