Paweł Świeboda
Pegida’s rise has been watched with much attention in Poland. The phenomenon tends to be regarded as a reaction to globalisation and a way of fuelling debate about its discontents. Polish observers note that although Pegida’s leadership is of dubious reputation, its demonstrations attract many disenchanted members of the middle class. Pegida is therefore seen as a reflection of the different pressures that have built up within German society.
Attention is drawn to the fact that xenophobia had preceded Pegida, with most references being made to the 2010 book by Thilo Sarrazin (“Deutschland schafft sich ab”), where he called liberal policy towards the Muslim minority “a self-elimination of the state”. Polish observers are also aware that Pegida is strongest in Eastern Germany, where right-wing views are particularly pronounced, as observed by the recent report of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (“Die Mitte im Umbruch”). Concern about Pegida in Poland is all the greater given the pro-Russian attitudes of its leadership. Lutz Bachmann, Pegida’s ex-leader, has been quoted as saying that the German government is fuelling conflict with Russia instead of searching for accommodation with Mr Putin. Such views cannot go down well with Polish public opinion, deeply worried about the spread of Russian influence within parts of the European political spectrum.
The second stream of Polish reactions to Pegida has to do with attitudes towards immigration across Europe. Poland is a country of both emigration and immigration, with the latter phenomenon only gradually growing in strength. The Islamic community is estimated to be no more than 30,000 in total. Poland’s elite is acutely aware of the need to prepare for an eventual increase in immigration, which is made more urgent by the country’s changing demographic structure. However, in the broader discourse, Pegida’s rise is sometimes interpreted simplistically as a failure of multiculturalism and “openness” to immigration. This is in line with Pegida’s own claim that European governments supposedly have no idea how to handle Islamic fundamentalism.
Finally, there is the question of Pegida’s direct resonance in Poland. For the moment, the influence is rather muted. It is clear that Pegida’s leaders clearly intend portraying themselves as a movement whose influence spreads beyond Germany, with anti-Islamic demonstrations in Copenhagen, Malmö or Vienna. However, Polish journalists noted attentively that although protesters in Dresden last year waved Polish flags, those who did so did not speak a word of Polish.
Paweł Świeboda explains how the Pegida marches are perceived in Poland (photo: CC BY-SA 2.0 Blu-News)
The founders of the Polish branch of Pegida say that the movement has arrived in Poland through a growing realisation that something wrong is happening to Europe and everyone has to stand up against it. In anonymous interviews, they warn that Islamisation is a challenge to the European system of values, free choice and free speech. Pegida aims to “open people’s eyes to an entirely new problem”, they say. This is meant to explain the chosen methods, by means of which Pegida supposedly wants to awaken people to act in the defence of their culture, habits and national legacy.
The founders of the Polish branch of Pegida say that the movement has arrived in Poland through a growing realisation that something wrong is happening to Europe and everyone has to stand up against it. In anonymous interviews, they warn that Islamisation is a challenge to the European system of values, free choice and free speech. Pegida aims to “open people’s eyes to an entirely new problem”, they say. This is meant to explain the chosen methods, by means of which Pegida supposedly wants to awaken people to act in the defence of their culture, habits and national legacy.
The founders of the Polish branch of Pegida say that the movement has arrived in Poland through a growing realisation that something wrong is happening to Europe and everyone has to stand up against it. In anonymous interviews, they warn that Islamisation is a challenge to the European system of values, free choice and free speech. Pegida aims to “open people’s eyes to an entirely new problem”, they say. This is meant to explain the chosen methods, by means of which Pegida supposedly wants to awaken people to act in the defence of their culture, habits and national legacy.
The Pegida FB page in Poland has about 4600 supporters at the time of writing. They include many Poles living abroad. The first entries date back to the time of the terrorist attacks in Paris and claim to expose the “truth” about Islam. Asked about whether the movement will surface on Polish streets, one of their founders has told Gazeta Wyborcza that it will happen “in due course”. The leaders of Polish Pegida describe themselves as realist, not racist, and claim to carry out their activities with a sense of responsibility.
Polish nationalists interpret the birth of Pegida as an awakening of national ferment in Germany, long supressed after the last World War and part of a wider phenomenon in Europe. They also see it as a protest by German society against indoctrination and a refusal to accept the elite’s logic of diversity and tolerance. They note that apart from the slogan of national “awakening”, which controversially goes back to the 1920s, Pegida has also adopted the “We are the People” slogan of the democratic opposition in the former GDR.
Polish commentators have no doubt that the rise of Pegida has met with a firm and unequivocal reaction in Germany, with Chancellor Merkel saying she would not allow the spread of hatred and the justice minister Heiko Maas calling Pegida a “shame on Germany”. It is noted that mainstream politicians and commentators perceive Pegida as an attack against liberal democracy. Poland herself is not entirely spared of political extremism, although this tends to become more vocal only occasionally with the Independence Day demonstrations becoming their main focal point. Therefore Poland will watch attentively not only the evolution of Pegida itself but also the type of conclusions that are drawn from its rise within Germany’s debate about itself.
Read also other contributions to the series on our “Understanding PEGIDA in context” focus page.
