The conflicting missions of Viktor Orbán

The Hungarian premier’s alignment with Putin’s Russia sits increasingly uneasily with his domestic and European political ambitions.

In The Little Dictators, published in 1975, Anthony Polonsky provided a masterly account of the failed attempt to introduce democratic political institutions in the countries of east-central and eastern Europe after World War I. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the countries in the region gradually fell under the sway of authoritarian leaders and illiberal ideologies, while the growing power and self-confidence of Nazi Germany, accompanied by the Nazis’ skilful use of propaganda, convinced many that democracy had been an abject failure.

In many ways, Hungary’s long-serving prime minister Viktor Orbán is reminiscent of the ‘little dictators’ whose divisive policies, loudly trumpeted patriotism and authoritarian instincts defined the politics of the region between the wars. According to the European Parliament, Orbán and his Fidesz party have engineered a ‘breakdown in democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights’, transforming Hungary ‘into a hybrid regime of electoral autocracy’.

Compelling reasons

Commentators have long speculated that, having achieved what was seen until very recently as an unassailable position in Hungary, Orbán yearns to play a pivotal role in Europe. Aside from his vanity and vaulting ambition, there may be compelling domestic reasons why Hungary’s premier is increasingly preoccupied with European Union affairs.

Arresting European integration and redefining the EU as an association of sovereign states, jealous of their national rights and cultural traditions—a major element in a speech Orbán gave in Băile Tușnad, Romania in July 2023—would limit the scope and severity of what he considers EU ‘meddling’ in Hungary’s internal affairs, part of what he sees as a concerted effort to remove his government from office. Adverse rulings by the Court of Justice of the EU have been embarrassing as well as costly, while the European Parliament has repeatedly censured the Orbán regime for its flagrant violations of EU norms, even calling on the European Council and member states to take further measures against Hungary in accordance with article 7(2) of the Treaty of European Union.

The blocking of substantial EU funds earmarked for Hungary, because of rule-of-law abuses, dismayed its cash-strapped government and helped to strengthen Orbán’s resolve to challenge the ‘federalist’ orientation of the EU, in concert with a growing constituency of far-right politicians in member states. He appears to have calculated that halting and even reversing the EU’s political trajectory can ensure his government’s long-term survival and unrestricted freedom of action in Hungary, while spearheading such a high-profile international campaign will enhance his position as one of the leaders of a re-energised radical right in Europe.

Patriots for Europe

The formation of Patriots for Europe (PfE), an association of national conservative and far-right parties, after the European Parliament elections, is a key element in Orbán’s efforts to achieve ‘a more favourable balance of power in Europe’. His vision of a ‘defanged’, state-centric EU is reflected in the PfE’s ‘Manifesto for Europe’—remarkably similar, in content and tone, to the Băile Tușnad speech.

Addressing a largely sycophantic Hungarian audience, Orbán had emphasised there the ‘struggle’ between ‘federalists and sovereigntists’ within the EU, accusing the ‘federalists’ of attempting to topple ‘sovereigntist’ governments, including his own. In the same vein, the Manifesto for Europe asserts that ‘[t]he dividing line of politics today is … between centrists who proclaim a new Europe and patriots and sovereigntists’. It stresses the need to curb the power of ‘European institutions’, ‘powerful globalist forces’ and ‘unelected bureaucrats’ intent on creating a ‘European central state’.

Whether Orbán and the PfE will succeed in becoming the dominant force on Europe’s far right is doubtful. With the participation of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom, Spain’s Vox, Matteo Salvini’s Liga, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, Hungary’s Fidesz and several smaller parties, PfE is already the third largest group in the European Parliament, with a total of eighty-four MEPs. Despite this impressive start, however, Orbán and PfE will almost certainly be hampered by chronic divisions within this political family.

Post-election there are currently three far-right groups in the parliament: PfE, the European Conservatives and Reformists with 78 MEPs (including Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy and Poland’s Law and Justice party) and the smaller, more extreme Europe of Sovereign Nations (in which Alternative für Deutschland is the dominant element). Relations among as well as within these rival groupings will almost certainly be strained by personality clashes as well as policy disagreements, including over support for Ukraine in its efforts to repel Russian aggression.

Even though Orbán and PfE are unlikely to become the dominant element in Europe’s burgeoning radical right, they may still play an important role in ‘redirecting European politics’, as envisaged by the manifesto. Cas Mudde has warned that ‘the foundation of PfE (and, to a lesser extent, the even newer Europe of Sovereign Nations) will help to further mainstream the far right in the EU’. That will almost certainly lead to growing acceptance of its vision of resurgent, fully sovereign nation-states at the heart of a humbled, less assertive EU.

Close alignment

Orbán’s hopes of playing a leading role in ‘redirecting European politics’ may be hampered by his increasingly close alignment with Moscow. Within days of Hungary assuming the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, Orbán held meetings with the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in Kyiv and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in Moscow, ostensibly to promote a peace agreement between their warring countries.

Orbán is however an unlikely and scarcely credible peacemaker. Since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against its neighbour, he has persistently impeded efforts by the EU to provide economic and military assistance to Ukraine, asserting that the conflict is ‘a war between two Slavic peoples, and … one which we want to stay out of’. Orbán’s comments pointedly ignore the conflict’s context—Russia’s heinous violation of international law—and he has even suggested that the west provoked Russia into waging war.

Unsurprisingly, Orbán’s self-proclaimed ‘peace mission’ has faced widespread condemnation. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, dismissed Orbán’s initiative—launched without consultation with EU institutions—as ‘nothing but an appeasement mission’. Charles Michel, outgoing president of the European Council, reminded Orbán that the EU’s rotating presidency of the Council of the EU had ‘no role in representing the Union on the international stage and received no European Council mandate to engage on behalf of the Union’. And the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to condemn Orbán’s visit to Moscow as ‘a blatant violation of the EU’s Treaties and common foreign policy, including the principle of sincere cooperation’, urging that ‘this violation should be met with repercussions for Hungary’.

Orbán is not a fool and he is rarely, if ever, poorly briefed. He must have fully anticipated the furious reaction to his spurious ‘mission’, particularly from the EU and Hungary’s western allies. He must also have understood that Ukraine would be very unlikely to view him as an honest broker, that he would have absolutely no leverage with Putin and that his behaviour would only further isolate Hungary within the EU and the wider ‘family’ of western nations, while doing nothing to advance the cause of peace. So why did he embark on it?

There is broad agreement that Orbán’s sham mission only benefits Russia. According to Jamie Dettmer, his visit to Moscow was ‘calibrated for maximum effect’ and was ‘aimed at sowing further corrosive doubt’ in the minds of western governments which have been supporting an increasingly beleaguered Ukraine.

Péter Krekó, director of the Budapest-based Political Capital Institute, has described Orbán as ‘Putin’s most useful idiot’, an assessment that fails to do justice to Orbán’s Machiavellian character. Krekó rightly charges him with turning Hungary into an ‘extension of Russian foreign policy’—a strategy that has brought few tangible economic rewards, while resulting in the loss of significant EU funds. As Krekó acknowledges, however, political calculations may underlie Orbán’s growing orientation towards authoritarian states, including Russia and China.

Weakening credibility

In 2014, Orbán achieved international notoriety when he pledged to turn Hungary into an ‘illiberal’ democracy. In that speech, he expressed his belief in the eventual ascendancy of states whose political systems were ‘not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even democracies’. In choosing to align himself with Putin’s Russia in its vicious war against Ukraine, Orbán may be motivated as much by his belief in the ultimate triumph of dictatorships and authoritarian states over western liberal democracies, in the emerging new world order, as by his conviction as to the inevitability of a Russian victory over a militarily under-resourced and exhausted Ukraine.

Financial considerations may be an additional factor. While most Hungarians may have gained little from Hungary’s expanding commercial links with Russia, as Krekó argues, other commentators have drawn attention to ‘overpriced, opaque projects’ with Russia and China that will enable ‘government-connected business people [in Hungary] to make exorbitant profits’, frequently ‘at the expense of the Hungarian taxpayer’.

At some point, Orbán may have to choose. An increasingly close alignment with Putin’s Russia may make it more difficult to realise his ambition of playing a leading role in effecting ‘a more favourable balance of power in Europe’. While there has been growing support for Putin among some far-right parties in Europe, including the AfD in Germany, and faltering support for Ukraine from others, including Law and Justice in Poland, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains a deeply divisive issue. Orbán’s apparent willingness to subordinate Hungary’s national interests to those of Russia will inevitably weaken his credibility as a genuine ‘sovereigntist’ and as a unifying leader of Europe’s radical right.