The vanishing act of Social Europe: Will it rise again?

Grand promises of a “strong social Europe” have given way to a sidelined agenda. As the Commission shifts focus, the EU must decide: will social policy make a comeback or fade into irrelevance?

European social policy over the past decade has felt like a magic trick: from a social “triple A” to “a strong social Europe for just transitions,” audiences were captivated by grand promises. Then, suddenly, social Europe vanished. When Ursula von der Leyen first announced her Commissioners-designate in 2024, policy areas like “social” or “employment” were conspicuously absent. Instead, both Roxana Mînzatu and Hadja Lahbib were tasked with “preparedness.” While von der Leyen has since backtracked on this decision, uncertainty persists: what does the next Commission have in store for social policy?

The Commission’s priorities

Based on von der Leyen’s political guidelines and her mission letters, two main trends can be expected: (a) the subordination of the “social” to the “economic” and (b) the management of the status quo. These trends are evident in two social policy flagship projects: the “Union of Skills” and the further implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

The “Union of Skills” aims to strengthen “human capital,” serving economic goals. According to Mînzatu’s mission letter, “ensuring that no one is left behind” supports “prosperity and productivity, as well as the success of the twin green and digital transitions.” This entails further work on the European education area, support for European degree programmes and university alliances, a strategy for vocational education, and an action plan on basic skills and STEM education. Workers are to be re- and upskilled. Mobility is also key: the Commission aims to attract qualified migrants, improve the recognition of qualifications across borders, and encourage cross-border school cooperation.

In implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights, economically driven investment in skills continues to dominate; the Commission frames labour gaps and skill shortages as strains on productivity and competitiveness. By 2025, a new action plan on implementing the Pillar should be presented, with a focus on improving occupational health and safety and preparing workplaces for digitalisation. Commissioner Mînzatu is also tasked with developing a “Quality Jobs Roadmap,” a “new Pact for European Social Dialogue,” and a coherent framework for “addressing long-term care workforce challenges.” Perhaps most notably, the Commission aims to create a European anti-poverty strategy alongside a plan for affordable housing. Many other plans reiterate existing policies and frameworks, such as European funds and the Child Guarantee.

Some achievements, major blind spots

The new Commission agenda acknowledges important issues, most notably (a) the economic benefits of social policy emphasised by the social investment approach and (b) the need to do more to implement existing commitments. However, this rather unambitious agenda is, at best, a missed opportunity and, at worst, a step back for social Europe. On a positive reading, the Commission’s emphasis on investment may justify social policies in an era of looming austerity. Yet, this neglects the crucial role the Commission itself plays in actively shaping the “social Europe” debate. By holding back on more ambitious plans and largely deprioritising social protection, the Commission fosters an environment conducive to stagnation. Moreover, the current Commission’s interpretation of social investment is incomplete. Effective social investment is not only about the economic benefits of high-skilled “human capital” but also about socially supporting individuals. This distinction is vital, as the promise of a social Europe serves not only economic but also political and, foremost, social functions. Sidelining these elements risks misappropriating the idea of social investment as an excuse for social neglect.

Three areas of improvement

Simplifying the issue at hand, the Commission should focus on three key areas to complement von der Leyen’s announcements: protecting the individual, the social contract, and the political system.

First, to protect the individual, the Commission should aim to ensure minimum living standards for all. While initiatives like the anti-poverty strategy are well-intentioned, there is a risk that ultimate responsibility will too easily be pushed to Member States. The Commission must find ways to act more decisively in areas where individuals primarily identify as Europeans and lack protection from any individual Member State. This particularly concerns intra-EU migrants and could be achieved, for instance, through a European minimum income scheme for jobseekers and enhanced exportability of benefits.

Second, protecting the social contract is essential for social investment to succeed. If investment in skills is to lead to individual and societal prosperity through work, this requires equal opportunities and a guarantee that effort yields adequate rewards. A social contract that demands citizens work hard must also ensure they can reap the fruits of their labour. Crucially, this must not be misconstrued as a call for deregulation. Instead, the Commission must ensure market-correcting mechanisms, such as the Directives on minimum wages and pay transparency, are diligently implemented and supported by additional legislation, for instance, against the exploitation of workers in migratory and subcontracting contexts. To enforce these measures, the European Labour Authority needs to be significantly strengthened in terms of resources and formal competences.

Third, protecting the system should be a priority for the Commission. One of the most promising policies here is the idea of a European unemployment (re-)insurance scheme. Discussed and refined over nearly half a century and partially tested during the COVID-19 pandemic via SURE, this policy would provide a critical automatic stabiliser against fiscal and social shocks. Concrete proposals for such a scheme are well-known within the Brussels bubble and beyond. Von der Leyen herself promised a European unemployment re-insurance during the last legislature – arguably one of social Europe’s clearest cases of untapped potential.

All three priorities require de facto grand coalitions at EU level and strong Member State support. Given the rise of the radical right and the recent erosion of trust between major EU parties, external pressure on national and European decision-makers must intensify if European social policy is to advance meaningfully over the next five years. The EU’s social future hinges, perhaps more than ever, on whether pro-Europeans can unite as genuine pan-European actors. This includes pro-European parties and movements, welfare associations, social partners, civil society organisations, and interest groups.

While the current outlook may seem bleak, it would not be the first time that “social Europe” has been declared dead, only to rise from the ashes years later. Perhaps European social policy is merely experiencing a temporary ebb on the political agenda. Crucially, however, social policy does not adhere to predetermined laws of nature. It is not inevitable but achieved through struggle. Von der Leyen aptly titled her political guidelines “Europe’s choice.” After all, deprioritising the “social” is precisely that: a choice.

This article is part of the Project “EU Forward” Social Europe runs in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.