Ukraine: a bitter armistice or war until victory?

After two years of war, victory eludes Ukraine yet must be denied Russia—a frozen conflict is the least bad scenario.

Two years on from the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the goal throughout of the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz—criticised by many as hesitant—that Ukraine must not lose the war and Russia must not win it, was and remains the best Ukraine can hope for. The initial optimism that Vladimir Putin’s regime might withdraw its troops—in the face of comprehensive economic sanctions, robust military and civilian support from western Europe and the United States and Ukrainian successes at the front—has not materialised.

For Russia, not winning means that it cannot turn a free Ukraine into a vassal state despite certain territorial conquests, that the confiscated Russian assets to the value of $300 billion remain frozen, that the sanctions continue and that it remains isolated from its European neighbours. It will continue to pay a high price for the invasion of Ukraine and, despite its discrete gains, will eventually awake from its dreams of Russian great-power status, excluded from Europe and dependent on China.

For Ukraine, not losing means that it stops the Russian advance and achieves a ceasefire ending the trench warfare. An independent Ukraine—albeit not within the borders of 2013—is firmly anchored in the economic, political and security structures of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The question of whether Ukraine is ‘merely’ defending its national independence or actually upholding Europe’s values is comparatively irrelevant to the central challenge of stopping Russia’s aggressive foreign policy. Regardless of Ukraine’s internal deficiencies, the further east the line of confrontation with Russia, the better for democratic Europe—at least until a policy asserts itself in Russia focused on neighbourliness and co-operation instead of ‘spheres of influence’ and an imperial backyard.

Military aid unprecedented

No one can seriously say whether more rapid delivery of even more weapons would have defeated Russia or instead triggered a world-threatening counter-reaction. From a rational point of view, the Russian attack on Ukraine was an obvious mistake. With someone such as Putin, who makes colossal unforced errors, insane military steps could not and cannot be ruled out as irrational, especially when he feels cornered.

The amount of western military aid—even if more is always possible—has been unprecedented. Of the total of €247 billion in military, financial and humanitarian aid provided between January 2022 and October 2023, the US with €75 billion and Germany with €40 billion (including Germany’s share of European Union aid) have been by far the most important supporters.

The spending will not stop there and it can be assumed that the US will expect Europe to bear a greater share of the burden, regardless of the outcome of the elections in November. Despite all the concern about the possible return of Donald Trump as president—in no way a forgone conclusion—this would most likely not herald the end of NATO but mean that its umbrella would become more expensive more quickly for Europeans than under Joe Biden.

If a majority cannot be found in Congress to provide further funds, the west could support Ukraine in purchasing weapons with interest- and principal-free credits from the frozen $300 billion of seized Russian assets. To make it clear this was not a confiscation, it would be stipulated that this loan would in no way affect Russian property rights but would only be granted until a Ukrainian/Russian peace treaty was concluded.

Western industrial capacity exceeds that of Russia many times over. If Russia were on its own, it would be conceivable that at some point this year or next Ukraine could obtain superiority in weapons supplied. This hope is however unlikely to be realised, as in addition to arms deliveries from Iran and North Korea, China in particular has massively expanded its exports of industrial goods that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. China is thus making clear that a Russian defeat is not in its interests.

Massive population loss

Between 1991 and 2021, the population of Ukraine fell from 52 million to 44 million, of whom 5-6 million were by then living in regions in the east outside of Kyiv’s control. Since the war began, Ukraine has lost a further 8.5 million people, due to the Russian occupation (1.5 million) and refugee flight (7 million). In January 2023, around 31 million people were still living in the government-controlled areas; that figure is now likely to be closer to 30 million. This is an unprecedented population decline, which will continue to exacerbate due to the war and an extremely low birth rate.

Europe’s generous willingness to open its borders unconditionally for refugees was an impressive sign of solidarity. But it dramatically exacerbates Ukraine’s demographic problems in the short, medium and long term.

The integration courses immediately offered to Ukrainian refugees in receiving countries such as Germany betrayed a conflict of interest between Ukraine, facing a massive loss of population, and European countries interested in its skilled labour. The longer the war lasts, the greater that potential conflict will become. The more Ukrainians are integrated in host countries, the higher their personal interest will be in remaining in the EU, rather than returning to a destroyed and impoverished Ukraine. Their desire for safety and better living standards will increasingly be at odds with the Ukrainian state’s interest in stopping and indeed reversing the exodus.

The willingness to return is also reduced by the fact that the home location of some of the refugees is occupied by Russia, meaning they can return to Ukraine but not to their home towns. At the same time, as the war drags on and integration in the host countries progresses, it becomes more attractive for husbands/fathers to follow the women and children who comprise the bulk of the refugees, given the male military call-up, rather than for them to return to Ukraine. Already 600,000 Ukrainian men of working age are living in the EU and last year in all almost 500,000 more people left Ukraine, despite a largely stable front line.

Desirable but unattainable

According to opinion polls, a majority of the Ukrainian population is still in favour of sticking to maximal war targets. But the willingness to risk their lives for that has decreased: those prepared to do so have already been on the front line for two years. The average age of Ukrainian soldiers is already very high at 43 and the mobilisation of 500,000 additional soldiers will not succeed on a voluntary basis. If Ukraine is forced to resort to massive compulsory recruitment, the movement of draft dodgers to Europe will continue. Europe will have to decide whether it wants to continue generously to accept Ukrainians who are understandably afraid of war and prefer to leave the fighting to others.

If Ukraine wants to be able to mobilise hundreds of thousands more soldiers, not only must the haemorrhage be stopped but millions of women must be motivated to return, to substitute for as many male workers as possible on the home front. In this context, it would be hard for Ukrainians, but beneficial for Ukraine, to let the special residence status for Ukrainians in EU countries expire in March 2025—and to build flats there instead of paying benefits to Ukrainians remaining in the union.

Putin must not be allowed to get away with his land grab, say those who are in favour of fighting until a Ukrainian victory. If he can keep his loot, this will only encourage him to continue the war after some breathing space and to threaten, harass and possibly invade other European countries. The proponents of this maximalist position do not however have an answer as to what to do if the desirable turns out to be unattainable.

No one on the western side has signalled a willingness to support Ukraine with soldiers as well as weapons. Yet this would probably be necessary to achieve victory over Russia, in view of the exhaustion of Ukrainian troops and the limited number of potential additional recruits. Such a direct NATO-Russia confrontation has not even been advanced by Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chair of the Bundestag defence committee and the most bellicose German politician, or by any leader from NATO’s eastern-European member states historically most familiar with Russian domination.

Freezing the conflict

If the whole of Ukraine cannot be liberated in view of the balance of power, if countless more people are at risk of dying in a trench war that will last for years and Ukraine will be further destroyed and depleted, it seems inevitable and strategically necessary to talk about the risk, the price and the possibility of freezing the conflict.

If, as is feared, Russia is not defeated, there is a threat of attack on other countries and possibly even NATO states. In view however of the weaknesses of the Russian army over the past two years of war and the massive Russian losses in terms of men and matériel, the risk of an immediate attack on other countries—whatever Putin’s wishes—should not be overestimated. Russia will not have recovered the necessary military strength for years to come.

As the price for a ceasefire, Ukraine would have to concede eastern parts of the country for the foreseeable future, not de jure but de facto. The loss of territory is bitter, is contrary to international law and should not be recognised diplomatically under any circumstances. On the other hand it means—even if this sounds justifiably outrageous and cynical to many Ukrainians—that an exhausted Ukraine would not have to cope with the costly reconstruction of devastated territories and the difficult reintegration of part of the population living in the occupied territories, especially Crimea which has been under occupation for a decade.

It is also difficult to say how the relationship between liberator and liberated would develop. In addition to those who yearn every day for liberation from Russian rule and those who have fled and would like to return, there are those among Russian speakers who have come to terms with the occupying forces, in some cases collaborating with or even welcoming them. Peaceful reunification with those eastern Ukrainians who have fought with Russian troops against the Ukrainian army would likely be the most difficult.

Unwavering support

A bitter armistice is paradoxically only conceivable if Ukraine can mobilise sufficient forces and maintain the necessary support to sustain otherwise the trench warfare. Considering the possibility of a ceasefire does not mean denying Ukraine military support—rather, it requires a clear determination to provide it. Indeed the recent setbacks at the front underline the urgency of unwavering military support for Ukraine.

Furthermore, if a ceasefire is to be permanent and not used by Putin as a breathing space for the next attack, a deterrent armament of Ukraine and indefinite western security guarantees are indispensable. Arming in a cold war to deter requires financial sacrifices, but it is preferable to further bloody years of war in which hundreds of thousands die.

A ceasefire presupposes that Russia no longer believes it can use war to achieve its broader goals in Ukraine. What could make Moscow realise this? Several factors play a role here: high losses on the battlefields, continued western military aid to Ukraine, the massive economic costs of the war, long-term effects of the sanctions, growing popular protests because of the many war victims, emigration of men unwilling to go to war and realisation that the Russian army in its weakened state is not capable of a complete military victory.

The sanctions must not only be maintained but more vigorous measures taken, to focus and enforce them. Personal sanctions could be extended considerably beyond the nearly 1,950 Russians affected so far: all key functionaries of the Russian power apparatus should be denied access to Europe.

Death of Navalny

The death of the leading Russian dissident Alexei Navalny last week, in the Arctic prison location to which he had been condemned on trumped-up charges, confirmed that Putin does not care at all about international reputation, standards or law. But at the same time it showed his fear that the moral authority of a single person—whose name he would never even utter—was a threat to his regime. As suggested by the prior murder near the Kremlin of his opponent Boris Nemtsov in 2015, he apparently has no trust that the Russian people will follow him if any alternative is permitted.  

Therefore everything should be done to support the opposition, in the country and in exile. Despite massive state propaganda, a significant proportion of the population is in favour of negotiations and does not personally support the ‘special military operation’. This includes giving young people who do not want to fight the opportunity to flee to Europe, refraining from demonising ‘the Russians’ and sending a message to its public that Europe wishes to live in friendship and peace with another Russia.

Even if Russia is on the offensive at the front, it faces structural weakness. Despite the noise and political dispute in Washington about aid to Ukraine, there are good reasons to assume the US will not allow a victory by Russia that would consolidate its position as a world power—and Moscow knows that. Even the erratic figure of Trump, if restored to the White House, could not allow the US (and by implication himself) to be seen to be humiliated.

The Kremlin has undoubtedly been surprised by the German chancellor and his determination to support Ukraine economically and militarily, with staying power and on a massive scale. German and European defence spending has increased massively since 2022 and arms production is being expanded. Time is not on Russia’s side here either.

Through the informal contacts which continue despite the war, Moscow needs to be told what the west is determined to do if Russia continues to wage war, but probably also how much injustice, together with Ukraine, it is willingly or unwillingly prepared to tolerate, if weapons are silent in return.

Positive counter-example

Negotiating with enemies is difficult. For Ukraine, such a ceasefire would be bitter after all the sacrifices and could only be justified if the west did everything it could to help rebuild the country and win the peace. As reconstruction succeeds, people will stay in Ukraine or return. Only then can the country, with western help, develop sufficient military, economic, political and demographic strength to remain a bulwark against Russian aggression. A strong and democratic Ukraine is the guarantee that Putin will not be able to use the ceasefire to shift the balance of power in his favour. 

A prosperous, democratic society in the free part of Ukraine protected by robust western security guarantees would be the positive counter-example to Putin’s rule, which has completely failed to develop Russia over the last quarter of a century. Ukraine has been mostly badly governed over the past 30 years, plagued by corruption, oligarch capitalism and mass poverty. It is not without reason that millions of people had already turned their backs on their homeland before the war.

After the ceasefire, winning the peace will be the second Herculean task of the Ukrainian people. The imperative of European solidarity and security policy is not only to stand by  Ukrainians in the war but also to help them rebuild their country, now and in the days to come.