- A regime that cannot win or stop: Putin can neither subjugate Ukraine nor end a war for which he has nothing to show, leaving aerial bombardment and hybrid attacks on Europe as his only tools.
- The long term must dictate the short term: The EU needs a strategy for a post-Putin Russia first, and only then a policy for the present stalemate, because the second must serve the first.
- Normalisation without capitulation: Europe will one day need a "normal", China-style relationship with Russia, one that includes non-punitive reparations for Ukraine but rejects 19th-century spheres of influence.
- Containment, not conquest: Forcing Russia’s defeat risks nuclear escalation; the realistic aim is a modified Cold War containment that holds the current lines and shields Ukraine’s cities.
- Fear, not humiliation: Any durable settlement must come from within Russia, but Moscow must also learn to fear a Europe capable of defending its democracies.
The Russian war with Ukraine is beginning to look like a war of attrition, with neither side winning nor losing. While the stakes are obviously higher for Ukraine, as it struggles to defend itself against a formidable enemy, the Russian Federation is arguably facing an existential crisis of a different nature.
The Putin regime cannot win, since it cannot subjugate Ukraine, but neither can it end the war, because it would have nothing to show for the catastrophic conflict it started. Aerial bombardment of Ukraine and a hybrid war against Europe are all it can offer for lack of progress on the battlefield. Putin may think time is on his side, but he will not live for ever. When he goes — my guess is within three to five years — it is very likely that a new order will emerge in Russia. It will not be a liberal democracy; it may be something worse than the current regime. But in all probability it will be different, with power less concentrated in the hands of an incompetent sycophant who has brought his country close to ruin.
While Putin still has a firm hold on power, it is not far-fetched to imagine the stirring of discontent within the elites and the realisation dawning that the current situation cannot go on for ever. Rational self-interest will eventually prevail.
The European Union (EU), collectively and through its individual member states, needs a long-term strategy for dealing with a post-Putin Russian Federation. It also needs a short-term one to deal with the current situation until the end of the regime. Both are difficult, but the key is the long-term strategy, which will dictate the short-term one. My reasoning is that negotiation to end the war with the Putin regime is not possible. The best we can hope for is for the current war of attrition to run its course until a frozen conflict emerges. The strategy for dealing with this situation should not be confused with the long-term one.
Europe, with or without the United States, has to accept that it will one day have to have a "normal" relationship with the Russian Federation, perhaps something like its relationship with China. This does not mean accepting everything. Pragmatism must prevail. It is also a fact of geography, with several member states bordering Russia, that a peaceful relationship is needed — but one that does not entail accepting 19th-century power games, such as Great Powers claiming a right to spheres of influence, in other words a right to subjugate their neighbours. To be sure, the US plays that game, but the EU must not, and it must also stop seeing itself only as a soft power.
Normalisation Is the Long-Term Objective
So some kind of normalisation is necessary and needs to be the long-term objective. The details cannot be decided now, but it must include war reparations for the rebuilding of Ukraine. Such reparations should not be punitive, designed to humiliate Russia. This leads to the short-term strategy.
The short-term strategy must serve the longer goal of peaceful co-existence. It is critical to appreciate that any durable solution to the current war can only come from within Russia. The West — the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance — cannot force it. To do so would be catastrophic. If we accept that negotiation is not possible with the Putin regime — which has unequivocally ruled out anything short of its maximalist demands, including the seizure of the four southern oblasts and a demilitarisation intended to facilitate the installation of a pro-Kremlin government — then the alternative of defeating it is high-risk. If defeat means capturing territory currently occupied, possibly also recapturing Crimea, annexed in 2014, the consequences could be catastrophic. The use of at least tactical nuclear weapons is not to be excluded as the regime faces collapse. Putin is a trapped rat and very dangerous. Fortunately, for now, he appears to remain rational.
There have been many warnings, most recently by the Russian oligarch Andrey Melnichenko (The Economist, 11 July 2026), of what would happen if Russia collapsed and Western governments were culpable. These warnings are undoubtedly designed to frighten Western governments away from supporting Ukraine. But supporting Ukraine is vital, above all for protection against missile attacks, which are all that Russia can offer now that Ukraine has perfected the art of long-range drone warfare.
In any case, Ukraine probably does not have the means to regain significant territory. It is unlikely that it could "defeat" Russia, in any sense of the term, even if the latter’s war economy is faltering. Russia still has the means for mass recruitment and a high-level acceptance of what for any other country would be intolerable casualties: a staggering 1.4 million battlefield casualties and some 450,000 deaths.
Containment for an Age of Attrition
The short-term policy that is called for must be some kind of containment policy, as in the old US Cold War approach to dealing with the Soviet Union, but modified for what is now an unconstrained war of attrition. The objective must be the continued defence of Ukraine, protection against the destruction of its cities, and the maintenance of the current battlefield lines.
The reasoning here is that Europe must bide its time, which is all that it has. Putin believed his "special operation" of February 2022 would be swift and would complete the annexation that began in 2014. When he realised his error, he opted, as many dictatorships do, to play the long game. But now, with the war approaching four and a half years, the long game is failing.
This does not mean simply doing nothing. The continued building of a European defence policy is critical. Russia needs to be made to fear a powerful Europe.
There are two psychological factors that are very important for dealing with Russia: humiliation and fear. As mentioned, the West needs to avoid humiliation. Russia must solve its Putin problem itself and not be forced to. Humiliation cannot be a weapon.
The other is fear — and it is more complicated. The Russian state, from the Tsarist security apparatus through the KGB to the Federal Security Service (FSB), has been based on fear. The Putin regime relies on terror and has more or less eliminated opposition through imprisonment or murder, from Anna Politkovskaya to Alexei Navalny. But it has not eliminated fear. It is perhaps a bitter outcome that this regime, as it finds itself trapped, isolated, and shunned, is itself now living in fear.
But Russia must also be made to fear a powerful Europe that is capable of demonstrating its commitment to defending the European democracies.
