Social Europe

  • EU Forward Project
  • YouTube
  • Podcast
  • Books
  • Newsletter
  • Membership

Options for Europe’s ‘geopolitical’ future

Jon Bloomfield 8th February 2023

Global challenges have left only one option off the table for the European Union—inertia.

geopolitical,Europe
Europe has to confront Putin—as this protester in Rome signalled the day after the invasion—yet when the smoke clears it must find a way to deal with Russia (Marco Iacobucci Epp / shutterstock.com)

Huge developments are shaking world politics. Global challenges—climate change, Covid-19, the war in Ukraine—increasingly demand collective European responses. For pro-Europeans, left-wingers and liberals they demand clear thinking on the options for Europe’s ‘geopolitical’ future.

Across the European Union, the forces of fragmentation no longer have the wind in their sails as they did after the ‘Brexit’ referendum in the United Kingdom and the 2016 election victory by Donald Trump in the United States. Then, many populists confidently forecast the demise of the EU. Today, leading nationalist politicians and their intellectual outriders have trimmed their ambitions, claiming they want to reform the union rather than demolish it.

The populists remain a potent force across Europe—from Italy to Sweden. Yet revived Russian militarism on their doorstep has made some east-European national populists—if not the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán—more cautious. For the moment, populist insurgency has been held at bay.

These profound challenges have closed off one option for the EU—inertia. The last three years have seen EU leaders as well as national politicians overcome structural paralysis, as global events have driven them to take more common action.

Pandemic as impetus

When she was appointed president of the European Commission in 2019, Ursula von der Leyen set the ambition for the EU to become more of a ‘geopolitical’ player. The new commission set about addressing climate change as its priority with a communication on the European Green Deal. Responding to the evolving scientific and policy agenda—rather than vague talk of a ‘green revolution’ or selective hype on specific technologies—it set out route maps on how to make the transition to ‘net zero’.

The pandemic provided the impetus to launch the programme. It jolted EU politicians across the political spectrum. The leaders of Europe’s four biggest countries—Germany, France, Italy and Spain—representing a diverse range of political forces, led the way in calling for major green-recovery programmes to respond to the economic damage caused.

In a further communication, ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’, the commission proposed an unprecedented €750 billion programme, NextGenerationEU, to finance additional expenditure by issuing common debt from funds raised on financial markets. This shattered the fiscal straitjacket neoliberals and German ordoliberals had previously insisted was sacrosanct. The EU would for the first time acquire a fiscal capacity.

Initially, the EU response to the pandemic as such was slow and unco-ordinated. But it did agree to adopt a common vaccine-purchasing programme and after a hesitant start was able to ensure that all member states received a steady flow of vaccines during 2021, while also agreeing to send a significant—though still inadequate—quantity to Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.

Old spectre revived

The massive Russian invasion of Ukraine a year ago, in clear breach of international law, revived an old spectre—a major European land war—which the very existence of the EU was meant to have vanquished. It has led the union to act in a co-ordinated fashion on a hitherto unknown scale.

It implemented an extensive range of economic, commercial and financial sanctions against Russian state institutions, banks and businesses. It introduced measures to reduce reliance on Russian oil and gas—via common-purchasing arrangements and extending the interconnectedness of European electricity and renewables markets—as well as energy demand. In co-ordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, member states immediately agreed to supply substantial military and defence equipment to Ukraine, supplemented by resort to common EU funds.

Whereas in 2015 only Germany and Sweden responded with an open-door policy to the Syrian refugee influx, this time all 27 member states have so acted. The Temporary Protection Directive gave immediate rights to Ukrainians to live and work in the EU for up to three years and to gain access to entitlements such as housing and medical care. The policy was a real, practical example of how the union could react quickly and collectively to a massive humanitarian crisis.

It also gave a positive response to Ukraine’s request for accession to the bloc. This is always a long process but the political reaction indicated that the EU clearly envisages post-war Ukraine within its embrace.

Of course, tensions and hesitations remain. EU structures do not make for easy decision-making, while the absence of a set of powerful and charismatic political leaders makes the task more difficult. But, contrary to the assertions of its familiar critics, the union has shown significant capacity and resilience during the crisis up to now.

Sometimes, the basic political story is simple and clear. Global challenges are increasingly demanding collective European responses. In the 21st century, the fragmentation of Europe would be a gift to big powers across the globe—that’s why Vladimir Putin’s Russia supported Brexit.

For Europe to survive and prosper it needs the capacity to organise and protect its own interests much more effectively than it has done until now. Otherwise, it will be a chessboard on which other powers play.

Unanswered question

The big unanswered question is: what kind of geopolitical actor does Europe aspire to be? Until recently, the union only appeared a significant world player on trade. It is beginning to show it can be a wider global actor with its Green Deal, its response to Covid-19 and on Ukraine. Its unity and resilience have surprised Eurosceptics and populists. Yet the precise shape and direction of this evolving European capacity remains uncertain.

Astonishingly, political leaders across the continent have so far been unable to offer, let alone agree, a clear vision of the type of Europe needed to address the challenges we face. This surely has to change.

Among senior European politicians only the French president, Emmanuel Macron, has offered a European vision, calling for the continent to have greater autonomy in economic and military affairs. His view of a ‘sovereignist’ Europe, with its Gaullist overtones, was gently rebuffed by Germany under Angela Merkel’s leadership.

With the long-term shift in the US focus towards Asia—Ukraine notwithstanding—Europe will however no longer be able to rely on the US military umbrella. The commitment of the current German government of Olaf Scholz to an enormous increase in defence spending shows how quickly post-invasion politics is moving.

The raison d’être of the EU is peace, reconciliation and the rule of law. It is conceivable that a combination of the rise of authoritarian nationalism globally, the competition among power blocs for rare raw materials and political forces seeking to exclude migrants could push the union in an authoritarian, ‘Europe first’ direction. However, the emergence of a centrist, liberal project promoting a more confident, assertive Europe on the global stage is more probable. Whether this will be a progressive project will depend on the extent to which it stands by the EU’s principles of the social-market economy and the rule of law and avoids the neoliberal errors of the past three decades.

Strategic thinking

This debate can be shaped by progressives by taking the core principles of the 1975 Helsinki Declaration and applying them to contemporary Europe. All the various segments of progressive opinion will need to revise and renew their strategic thinking.

Most importantly, to repair its lost links with the working class and low-income households, much of mainstream social democracy will have to shed its attachments to the neoliberal, ‘third way’ model of globalisation. Other parts of the left, such as La France Insoumise, have to recognise that economies have slipped the leash of the small and medium-sized nation-states Europe comprises. There are no nationalist boltholes in the interconnected 21st-century world.

The ‘new Labour’ infatuation with globalisation provoked a backlash in parts of the left which understandably wanted to reaffirm the significance of place and neighbourhood. Yet today’s multi-ethnic Europe makes it indispensable to resist nativists within the left, such as the Danish Social Democrats, who draw on an idealised ‘communitarianism’ to promote an exclusionary notion of identity, with harsh immigration and refugee policies. Progressive social solidarity accepts difference and recognises that in today’s Europe a solidaristic state can no longer be based on an ethnically homogenous ‘nation’ but has to be rooted in a secular understanding of citizenship.

The Ukraine war has reminded social democrats, liberals and greens of the limits of pacifism. Progressives were not pacifist in the face of Nazi aggression and they cannot be now, confronted with Putin. Yet wholehearted support for the defence of Ukraine cannot be taken as an endorsement for any repeat of NATO military adventures out of Europe. Dialogue and multilateralism will remain central to European engagement with its neighbours.

Common framework

The debate on the geopolitical future of Europe is just beginning. Progressives urgently need a common framework to push it in a democratic direction.

Senior progressive politicians must offer a resolute defence of the democratic values and adherence to the rule of law set out in the EU’s founding documents. Failure to enforce these requirements in Hungary and Poland has severely undermined the EU’s credibility. Europe’s democracy needs strengthening by streamlining decision-making, moving from the requirement for unanimity to qualified-majority voting and giving the European Parliament the right to table legislation, currently the preserve of the commission.

The progressive narrative must promote an EU that ditches austerity and addresses the economic and social shortcomings which have kept living standards low for two decades. This requires fundamental reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and a willingness to borrow for the green investments crucial to a net-zero future.

Externally, promoting a defence and foreign policy that gives Europe the capacity to defend itself will become more urgent if Trump or a similar politician becomes US president in 2024. A coherent approach across the continent to managing migration flows as well as a mechanism to respond to refugees in the spirit that the EU has displayed on Ukraine is also essential.

Dealing with Russia

The biggest and most difficult issue Europe will face at the end of the Ukraine conflict will be how to deal with Russia. This vast country sharing the European land mass and with a large population is not going to disappear. Indefinite ‘containment’, cold-war style, would mean the continuation of a sullen, morose Russia endlessly dependent on the exploitation of its oil and gas reserves. This would imperil targeted global greenhouse-gas emissions which require turning the Russian economy on to a low-carbon axis.

A postwar settlement will require Europe to use its diplomatic skills to cajole Russia in a new direction. For Europe to have a huge resentful neighbour on its doorstep would be a recipe for continued instability. Complicated as this will be, the Europe of the future is going to need to deal with Russia with an open hand—not a closed fist.

The continent’s future is up for grabs. Millions now recognise that as well as their individual identities, the multiple states of Europe need to come together, develop a clear narrative and support a common European capacity to deliver it. Progressive parties, social movements and leaders need to show they can match the task. Who is up to the challenge?

This draws on a report published by Compass

Jon Bloomfield
Jon Bloomfield

Jon Bloomfield is a writer, European policy specialist, environmental practitioner and author of Our City: Migrants and the Making of Modern Birmingham. He is an honorary research fellow at the University of Birmingham.

Harvard University Press Advertisement

Social Europe Ad - Promoting European social policies

We need your help.

Support Social Europe for less than €5 per month and help keep our content freely accessible to everyone. Your support empowers independent publishing and drives the conversations that matter. Thank you very much!

Social Europe Membership

Click here to become a member

Most Recent Articles

u4219834664e04a 8a1e 4ee0 a6f9 bbc30a79d0b1 2 Closing the Chasm: Central and Eastern Europe’s Continued Minimum Wage ClimbCarlos Vacas-Soriano and Christine Aumayr-Pintar
u421983467f bb39 37d5862ca0d5 0 Ending Britain’s “Brief Encounter” with BrexitStefan Stern
u421983485 2 The Future of American Soft PowerJoseph S. Nye
u4219834676d582029 038f 486a 8c2b fe32db91c9b0 2 Trump Can’t Kill the Boom: Why the US Economy Will Roar Despite HimNouriel Roubini
u42198346fb0de2b847 0 How the Billionaire Boom Is Fueling Inequality—and Threatening DemocracyFernanda Balata and Sebastian Mang

Most Popular Articles

startupsgovernment e1744799195663 Governments Are Not StartupsMariana Mazzucato
u421986cbef 2549 4e0c b6c4 b5bb01362b52 0 American SuicideJoschka Fischer
u42198346769d6584 1580 41fe 8c7d 3b9398aa5ec5 1 Why Trump Keeps Winning: The Truth No One AdmitsBo Rothstein
u421983467 a350a084 b098 4970 9834 739dc11b73a5 1 America Is About to Become the Next BrexitJ Bradford DeLong
u4219834676ba1b3a2 b4e1 4c79 960b 6770c60533fa 1 The End of the ‘West’ and Europe’s FutureGuillaume Duval
u421983462e c2ec 4dd2 90a4 b9cfb6856465 1 The Transatlantic Alliance Is Dying—What Comes Next for Europe?Frank Hoffer
u421983467 2a24 4c75 9482 03c99ea44770 3 Trump’s Trade War Tears North America Apart – Could Canada and Mexico Turn to Europe?Malcolm Fairbrother
u4219834676e2a479 85e9 435a bf3f 59c90bfe6225 3 Why Good Business Leaders Tune Out the Trump Noise and Stay FocusedStefan Stern
u42198346 4ba7 b898 27a9d72779f7 1 Confronting the Pandemic’s Toxic Political LegacyJan-Werner Müller
u4219834676574c9 df78 4d38 939b 929d7aea0c20 2 The End of Progess? The Dire Consequences of Trump’s ReturnJoseph Stiglitz

Eurofound advertisement

Ageing workforce
How are minimum wage levels changing in Europe?

In a new Eurofound Talks podcast episode, host Mary McCaughey speaks with Eurofound expert Carlos Vacas Soriano about recent changes to minimum wages in Europe and their implications.

Listeners can delve into the intricacies of Europe's minimum wage dynamics and the driving factors behind these shifts. The conversation also highlights the broader effects of minimum wage changes on income inequality and gender equality.

Listen to the episode for free. Also make sure to subscribe to Eurofound Talks so you don’t miss an episode!

LISTEN NOW

Foundation for European Progressive Studies Advertisement

Spring Issues

The Spring issue of The Progressive Post is out!


Since President Trump’s inauguration, the US – hitherto the cornerstone of Western security – is destabilising the world order it helped to build. The US security umbrella is apparently closing on Europe, Ukraine finds itself less and less protected, and the traditional defender of free trade is now shutting the door to foreign goods, sending stock markets on a rollercoaster. How will the European Union respond to this dramatic landscape change? .


Among this issue’s highlights, we discuss European defence strategies, assess how the US president's recent announcements will impact international trade and explore the risks  and opportunities that algorithms pose for workers.


READ THE MAGAZINE

Hans Böckler Stiftung Advertisement

WSI Report

WSI Minimum Wage Report 2025

The trend towards significant nominal minimum wage increases is continuing this year. In view of falling inflation rates, this translates into a sizeable increase in purchasing power for minimum wage earners in most European countries. The background to this is the implementation of the European Minimum Wage Directive, which has led to a reorientation of minimum wage policy in many countries and is thus boosting the dynamics of minimum wages. Most EU countries are now following the reference values for adequate minimum wages enshrined in the directive, which are 60% of the median wage or 50 % of the average wage. However, for Germany, a structural increase is still necessary to make progress towards an adequate minimum wage.

DOWNLOAD HERE

KU Leuven advertisement

The Politics of Unpaid Work

This new book published by Oxford University Press presents the findings of the multiannual ERC research project “Researching Precariousness Across the Paid/Unpaid Work Continuum”,
led by Valeria Pulignano (KU Leuven), which are very important for the prospects of a more equal Europe.

Unpaid labour is no longer limited to the home or volunteer work. It infiltrates paid jobs, eroding rights and deepening inequality. From freelancers’ extra hours to care workers’ unpaid duties, it sustains precarity and fuels inequity. This book exposes the hidden forces behind unpaid labour and calls for systemic change to confront this pressing issue.

DOWNLOAD HERE FOR FREE

ETUI advertisement

HESA Magazine Cover

What kind of impact is artificial intelligence (AI) having, or likely to have, on the way we work and the conditions we work under? Discover the latest issue of HesaMag, the ETUI’s health and safety magazine, which considers this question from many angles.

DOWNLOAD HERE

Social Europe

Our Mission

Team

Article Submission

Advertisements

Membership

Social Europe Archives

Themes Archive

Politics Archive

Economy Archive

Society Archive

Ecology Archive

Miscellaneous

RSS Feed

Legal Disclosure

Privacy Policy

Copyright

Social Europe ISSN 2628-7641